Problem of the Insolvent Heir by Hirsch, Adam J.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 74
Issue 4 May 1989 Article 1
Problem of the Insolvent Heir
Adam J. Hirsch
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Adam J. Hirsch, Problem of the Insolvent Heir , 74 Cornell L. Rev. 587 (1989)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol74/iss4/1
THE PROBLEM OF THE INSOLVENT HEIR
AdamJ. Hirscht
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ........................................... 588
II. The State of the Law .................................. 591
A. English Origins .......................... ...... 591
B. American Elaborations ............................ 592
C. Statutory Solutions ................................ 596
D. A Case-Study in Confusion ........................ 601
III. Theoretical Perspectives ............................... 603
A. Dominion Theory and the Problem of Analogy .... 605
B. Fraud Theory and the Problem of Reliance ........ 610
1. Voluntary Creditors ............................... 610
2. Involuntary Creditors ............................. 617
3. Exceptions ....................................... 623
C. Inheritance Theory and the Problem of Intent ..... 626
1. Beneficiary ...................................... 627
2. Benefactor ..... ........................... 632
3. Forced Share .................................... 638
IV. Cognate Problems ..................................... 640
A. Right of Election .................................. 640
B. W ill Contests ...................................... 645
V. Conclusion ............................................ 651
© 1989 by Adam J. Hirsch. All rights reserved.
t Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University. M.A. 1979,J.D. 1982, Ph.D.
1987, Yale University.
The author wishes to thank Michael Ansaldi, Anthony Herman, John Langbein,
John Larson, Robert Laurence, David Powell, Mack Player, and Mark Seidenfeld for
their helpful comments, and Carolyn West for her research assistance. Research for this
Article was supported by the Policy Studies Clinic, Florida State University College of
Law.
587
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
"The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from
their graves."
Frederic William Maitland'
"Actually there are, of course, no such distinctly segregated com-
partments in the law. Everywhere the fields of liability and doc-
trine interlock; everywhere there are borderlands and
penumbras ..
William Lloyd Prosser 2
I
INTRODUCTION
In their essence, gratuitous transfers are voluntary transfers. A
benefactor is ordinarily free to make such gifts and bequests as he
pleases. By the same token, "[t]he law certainly is not so absurd as
to force a man to take an estate against his will." The beneficiary
of a gratuity may accept or reject it at his discretion. Personal au-
tonomy and effectuation of intent have served as the traditional
touchstones of this area of the law.
Debtor-creditor law operates according to a different set of
premises and purposes. The fundamental axiom of debtor-creditor
law is that debtors incur an enforceable obligation to repay what
they borrow. Absent such an obligation, the supply side of the mar-
ket for credit would rapidly crumble.4 The creditor's right of recov-
ery thus lies at the core of debtor-creditor law, irrespective of the
debtor's personal wishes. If an insolvent debtor takes evasive ac-
tion, for instance by transferring his remaining assets to his rela-
tives, creditors can pursue those assets under the law of fraudulent
conveyances. 5
What, then, of a case implicating both the rules of inheritance
and of creditors' rights? Assume that an insolvent debtor is be-
queathed a corpus of assets. If he accepts the bequest, it will be
subject to levy by his creditors. If he declines, the bequest will go
I F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW I (A. Chaytor & W. Whit-
taker eds. 1969) (Ist ed. 1909).
2 W. PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 380 (1953).
3 Townson v. Tickell, 106 Eng. Rep. 575, 576-77, 1814-23 All E.R. 164, 165 (K.B.
1819) (Abbot, CJ.).
4 The threat to one's future opportunities for credit provides some incentive to
repay existing debts, as may other extra-legal contrivances, see Kronman, Contract Law
and the State of Nature, I J.L. EcON. & ORGANIZATION 5 (1985), but the market for credit
could not exist in its present form without the threat of coercive recovery via state ac-
tion. Furthermore, state action to support the market is socially beneficial, for it pro-
motes more efficient distribution of private resources.




elsewhere, ordinarily to a close relative. 6 Should the debtor under
these circumstances be bound to accept the gratuity? Should this be
an offer he cannot refuse? Considered from the vantage point of
gratuitous transfers law, the answer would seem to be no: The ben-
eficiary's intent is decisive, and a beneficiary cannot be "force[d]...
to take an estate against his will." 7 Considered from the vantage
point of debtor-creditor law, however, the answer would seem to be
yes: The creditor's right of recovery takes precedence over the
debtor's right to act as he pleases. Whether the debtor should be
obligated to accept the transfer thus appears to depend, at least
under conventional analysis, upon the observer's doctrinal frame of
reference.
I call this compound scenario the problem of the insolvent
heir.8 It is, in fact, only one of a cluster of problems that arise at the
intersection of gratuitous transfers law and debtor-creditor law.9
Viewed more broadly, the problem is representative of the struc-
tural tensions that develop whenever separate categories of legal
doctrine come into contact. Ever since the English courts first de-
vised the forms of action, judges have sliced the seamless web of the
law into discrete bits, each tending to generate its own autonomous
system of analysis and relief. The result, all too often, is inconsis-
tency at the various points of conjunction-a phenomenon that one
scholar has termed "interconceptual" conflicts of law. 10 The judi-
cial challenge posed in these areas is to reconcile and harmonize
rules within legal categories that have exhibited such a stubborn
tendency to branch off, even as they remain inextricably
intertwined.
This need not be an exercise in futility. No principle of law is
absolute, every right can be qualified." The rights at issue here are
6 Disclaimed assets flow into the residue (or, in the absence of a residuary clause,
are distributed according to the intestacy statute), unless either (1) the will specifies an
alternative beneficiary in the event of disclaimer, or (2) the antilapse statute operates to
shift the inheritance to the disclaimant's descendants. See 6 W. PAGE, ON THE LAW OF
WILLS § 49.12, at 55-57 (S. Bowe & D. Parker rev. ed. 1962).
7 See supra note 3.
8 The term was chosen for its terseness, at the cost of precision. Strictly speaking,
the issue can arise whenever an insolvent debtor is the beneficiary of a gratuitous trans-
fer, whether or not his benefactor is alive or dead, testate or intestate. Nonetheless,
"the problem of the insolvent beneficiary of a gratuity," though technically accurate,
lacks a certainje ne sais quoi.
9 In addition to the problem of the insolvent heir, the intersection of these two
areas of the law also gives rise to the problem of the insolvent decedent, and to the
problem of inheritance by a debtor in a federal bankruptcy proceeding. The author
intends to explore the latter issues in subsequent articles.
1O A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWs 309 (1962).
11 "All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all
in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those
on which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold their
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certainly no exception: When expedient, both gratuitous transfers
law and debtor-creditor law have accommodated competing legal
interests. For example, the principle of intent effectuation, though
fundamental to inheritance, bows to the imperative of protecting
dependents at the point where gratuitous transfers law and family
law meet: hence the creation of homestead rights and the family
allowance. 12 Similarly, the creditor's right of recovery takes a back
seat to the debtor's right to physical security whenever creditors'
remedies skate across the line into criminality.' 3 The problem, of
course, is to determine as a matter of policy which principle should
defer to the other at such legal junctures.
In his study of the intersection of tort and contract, Dean Pros-
ser observed that interconceptual conflicts between those two fields
of law led, in borderline cases, to enormous uncertainty. But, he
added,
the very uncertainty of the rules has permitted a degree of flexibil-
ity which has advantages of its own. Where the cause of action is
neither fish nor fowl, but both or either, the courts have been free
to look to the purpose of the rule of law in question .... When
the ghosts of case and assumpsit walk hand in hand at midnight, it
is sometimes a convenient and comforting thing to have a border-
land in which they may lose themselves.14
Such borderlands, Prosser thought, were conducive to bewilder-
ment but also to liberation from formalized modes of doctrinal
analysis.
Alas, those ghosts of actions have proven difficult to elude, even
in pitch-darkness. Though the problem of the insolvent heir has
produced plenty of uncertainty, it has occasioned little of the policy
analysis that Prosser envisioned. 15 On the contrary, courts in this
area have tended to oscillate between alternative modes of tradi-
tional analysis, with scarcely a nod to their social and economic
own when a certain point is reached." Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S.
349, 355 (1907) (Holmes, J.). See, e.g., Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1918) (limits on
rights under the First Amendment).
12 See infra note 216. See generally T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 34-
35 (rev. ed. 1953).
13 In fact, creditors' remedies are limited to a range well short of this line, in order
to protect debtors from consequential harm, and, in turn, to preserve the demand side
of the market for credit. See The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1692-92o (1977), and analogous state statutes; Countryman, The Bill of Rights and the
Bill Collector, 15 ARz. L. REV. 521 (1973).
14 W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 452.
15 There have been notable exceptions. One early judge, presented with the prob-
lem of the insolvent heir, fairly licked his chops as he reported that the case had "all this
rich meat in it." Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. Rep. 697, 708 (1879) (Bleckley,J.).
[Vol. 74:587590
THE INSOLVENT HEIR
foundations. We must probe those foundations, if the formalisms of
old are ever truly to be laid to rest.
II
THE STATE OF THE LAW
A. English Origins
The American law of rejection (or "disclaimer") 16 of inheri-
tances traces to England, specifically to the English system of feudal-
ism that has so pervasively (and persistently) colored the common
law of property. In their treatment of disclaimers, English courts
traditionally drew a sharp distinction between testate and intestate
succession. An heir, inheriting property in the absence of a will,
could not renounce his inheritance, irrespective of his state of sol-
vency. This rule derived from the feudal theory that tenancy over
land was not a matter of individual choice. Land could neither be
alienated nor devised; upon the tenant's death, the land over which
he held seisin was "cast" upon his heir, vesting in him eo instanti "by
the single operation of law,"' 17 in order to ensure the continued per-
formance of feudal services. Land became alienable in England by
the thirteenth century, and after 1540 it was devisable as well.18 But
the notion of "descent cast" lingered on in cases of intestacy. In-
deed, courts enlarged the notion, without a trace of feudal logic, to
cover intestate inheritance of personal property as well. 19
Meanwhile, a second line of cases established that a devisee,
inheriting property by will, had no obligation to accept it.20 Unlike
inheritance by operation of law, the testator's devise was conceived
to be "nothing more than an offer, which the devisee may accept or
refuse, and if he refuses, he is in the same situation as if the offer
had never been made."21 This result followed from the fact that a
16 As a term of art, "disclaimer" traditionally applied only to testate inheritance: a
devisee sought to disclaim, whereas an heir sought to "renounce." Today, these terms
are used interchangeably, and disclaimer can refer to the rejection of any sort of gratui-
tous transfer.
17 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *201 (Ist ed.
London 1765-69). On the feudal background of the doctrine of descent cast, see Laurit-
zen, Only God Can Make an Heir, 48 Nw. U. L. REv. 568 (1953); see generally A. SIMPSON, A
HISTORY OF THE LAND LAw (rev. ed. 1986).
18 The original Statute of Wills, making land for the first time legally devisable, was
enacted in 1540, 32 Hen. VIII, c.l (1540). In practice, however, land had been function-
ally devisable for as much as a century earlier by recourse to the use. See A. SIMPSON,
supra note 17, at 51-54, 173-92.
19 6 W. PAGE, supra note 6, § 49.1, at 36-37.
20 C. SHERRIN & R. BARLOW, WILLIAMS' LAw RELATING TO WILLS 256 n. b. (4th ed.
1974); Lauritzen, supra note 17, at 571 n. 21.
21 Townson v. Tickell, 106 Eng. Rep. 575, 576-77, 1814-23 All E.R. Rep. 164, 166
(1819) (Bayley, J.). Likewise, see the more graphic language of Ventris, J.: "[A] man
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devise might be "clothed with trusts" and thus could entail burden-
some duties.22 Yet, under the law of real property, title once again
vested in the devisee from the moment of the decedent's death,
rather than upon acceptance. 23 The decedent himself could not re-
tain title, and the theory of property then (as now) required that title
vest in someone; title could not be suspended, so to say, in mid-air.
What, then, was the status of the devisee's interest pending his deci-
sion? How could the transactional notion of offer and acceptance
be reconciled with the conveyancing notion of instantaneous trans-
fer of title to the grantee? Courts resolved this conceptual conflict
by resorting to a legal fiction. The devisee was simply presumed to
have accepted, and this presumption became conclusive upon actual
acceptance. If, however, the devisee disclaimed his inheritance, his
action demonstrated that "he never did assent to the devise, and
consequently, that the estate never was in him."' 24 In other words,
the disclaimer "related back" to the testator's death, and the devi-
see's "inchoate" title vanished retroactively. Thus did English law
distinguish the rights of heirs and devisees-and thus did it con-
tinue to do so, until the passage of reform legislation in this
century.2 5
B. American Elaborations
England's common law of disclaimer was received early into
American law. 26 Because at common law an heir could not re-
nounce his inheritance, American courts have always concluded
that, absent statutory revision, 27 insolvent heirs cannot avoid their
creditor's claims. Any attempt by the insolvent heir to abandon his
inheritance, it having vested at the moment of the intestate's death,
cannot have an estate put into him in spight of his teeth." Thompson v. Leach, 86 Eng.
Rep. 391, 396 (K.B. 1689).
22 Townson v. Tickell, 106 Eng. Rep. at 576-77, 1814-23 All E.R. Rep. at 165 (Bay-
ley, J.).
23 E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND I Ila
(London 1628).
24 Townson v. Tickell, 106 Eng. Rep. at 576-77, 1814-23 All E.R. Rep. at 166
(Holroyd,J.); Thompson v. Leach, 86 Eng. Rep. at 394-96. This analysis pertained only
to realty. Title to personalty vested in the personal representative pending acceptance
by the legatee. The reasons why this alternative solution to the conceptual conflict was
not also applied to real property are buried in history. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 14.6 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
25 The issue of the heir's right to disclaim has yet to be resolved unequivocally in
England, but the Administration of Estates Act of 1925 shifts title upon death initially to
the probate judge; thus, descent cast appears to be abolished. See C. SHERRIN & R.
BONEHILL, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION 339-44 (1987).
26 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw *34 n.(f), *534 (1873); Watson v.
Watson, 13 Conn. 83 (1839).
27 See infra text accompanying note 49.
592 [Vol. 74:587
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constitutes a subsequent transfer of owned property. Accordingly,
creditors can set aside the transfer as a fraudulent conveyance. 28
Similarly, disclaimer by an insolvent devisee who has already taken
possession of the corpus, 29 or who has delayed his disclaimer be-
yond a "reasonable" time,30 has been deemed ineffective, the con-
clusive presumption of acceptance having already been raised.31
But these rules failed to resolve whether an insolvent devisee, 32 re-
fusing delivery and acting promptly, could disclaim an inheritance at
a time when a transfer of his "own" property would be deemed
fraudulent. This issue had not arisen in the English cases. 33 With
no precedent to guide them, American courts began to offer a vari-
ety of answers.
One line of American cases, beginning in 1893, holds insolvent
disclaimer to be valid and effective against creditors.34 However,
28 See cases cited in Lauritzen, supra note 17, at 576 nn. 49-50; New York Trust Co.
v. Halkin, 68 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406-07 (1936). In one early case, dower rights were held
analogous to inheritance by operation of law, hence not disclaimable. Watson, 13 Conn.
at 83. Furthermore, under the common law Doctrine of Worthier Title, devises to the
testator's heirs were void to whatever extent the devisees would have taken the same
property via intestacy-"descent" being deemed "worthier" than "purchase." Thus, to
whatever extent a decedent's heirs received their inheritance by devise, the doctrine of
"descent cast" still applied to them, and prevented renunciation against creditors. Mc-
Quiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 23 Tenn. App. 434, 134 S.W.2d 197 (1939); Morris, The
W ills Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine, 54 MicH. L. REv. 451, 474-77 (1956); 6 W. PAGE,
supra note 6, § 49.3, at 40-41. With the advent of disclaimer statutes encompassing in-
testate succession, the issue has been substantially mooted, see infra text accompanying
note 49, but in those rare recent instances where the issue has been raised, the Doctrine
of Worthier Title has been disavowed. City Nat'l Bank of Birmingham v. Andrews, 355
So.2d 341 (Ala. 1978).
29 See generally Annotation, 93 A.L.R.2d 8 (1964); Voit v. Schultz, 232 Iowa 55, 4
N.W.2d 410 (1942).
30 Not surprisingly, courts have differed over what constitutes a "reasonable" time
in which to disclaim one's inheritance. See Annotation, 39 A.L.R.4th 633, 641-43 (1985);
Annotation, supra note 29, 22-23, 29-30.
31 Crumpler v. Barfied & Wilson Co., 114 Ga. 570, 40 S.E. 808 (1902); Strom v.
Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 164 P. 1100 (1917); In re Wilson's Estate, 298 N.Y. 398, 83 N.E.2d
852 (1948).
32 One case has held that the beneficiary of non-probate assets (life insurance, revo-
cable trusts, etc.) should be permitted to disclaim according to the same rules covering
devisees. In re Krakoff's Estate, 18 Ohio App. 2d 116, 179 N.E.2d 566 (1961). The
same result is achieved by statute in some jurisdictions. See Uniform Disclaimer of
Transfers Under Nontestamentary Instruments Act §§ 3-4 and comments, 8A U.L.A.
116-18 (1978). This issue may become increasingly important as will substitutes grow
more common. See generally Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of
Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984). Cf infra note 101 and accompanying text (on
rejection of inter vivos gifts).
33 In the earliest case to raise this question in America, counsel for the creditor
cited to civil law. See Stebbins v. Lathrop, 21 Mass. 33, 40 (1826) (issue raised but not
resolved).
34 Tarr v. Robinson, 158 Pa. 60, 27 A. 859 (1893); In re Krakoff's Estate, 18 Ohio
App. 2d at 117, 179 N.E.2d at 566; New York Trust Co. v. Halkin, 68 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup.
Ct. 1936). This is also the modem tax treatment; disclaimers are effective to avoid es-
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
most of the cases upholding insolvent disclaimer carve out excep-
tions to the general rule where the disclaimant has colluded with the
alternative beneficiary, 35 or where a creditor has reasonably relied
on the disclaiming debtor's acceptance of his inheritance. 36 As
these caveats appear almost exclusively in dicta, the precise defini-
tions of collusion and reasonable reliance remain largely unex-
plored. 37 In addition, at least one case has held that the
"reasonable time" granted to the devisee to disclaim his inheritance
will be shortened when the rights of his creditors are at stake. 38 But
once past these hurdles, opinions in this line uphold the effective-
ness of a disclaimer whether or not the objecting creditor has re-
duced his claim to judgment 39 or has even levied execution against
tate and gift taxes. Martin, Perspectives on Federal Disclaimer Legislation, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
316, 316-17 & n.5 (1979).
35 The burden of proof is on the creditor to prove collusion. Bradford v. Calhoun,
120 Tenn. 53, 56, 109 S.W. 502, 504 (1907).
36 E.g., Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 479, 187 N.W. 20, 23 (1922); Brad-
ford, 120 Tenn. at 53, 109 S.W. at 502; First Nat'l Bank of Houston v. Toombs, 431
S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968) (dicta).
37 The collusion exception appears to contemplate cases in which the disclaimant
retains some benefit, for example, free use of the disclaimed property or a "parking"
arrangement whereby the disclaimant can redeem the disclaimed property at a later
date. See Funk v. Grulke, 204 Iowa 314, 213 N.W. 608 (1927); Bradford, 120 Tenn. at 55,
109 S.W. at 504; see also In re Estate of Aylsworth, 74 Il. App. 375, 219 N.E.2d 779
(1966) (collusive disclaimer of spendthrift trust). Presumably, a secret agreement to
pass the property on to another party would also constitute "collusion." Since a dis-
claimer ordinarily operates to divert bequests to other members of the disclaimant's
immediate family, the opportunities for collusion are manifest, yet the evidence is elu-
sive. Surreptitious collusion is thus probably common in these cases. See Estate ofJen-
sen, 26 Cal. App. 3d 474, 481, 102 Cal. Rptr. 617, 621, (1972); Stein v. Brown, 18 Ohio
St.3d 305, 307, 480 N.E.2d 1121, 1122 (1985); Note, Renunciation of Testamentary Gift to
Defeat Claims of Devisee's Creditors, 43 YALE L.J. 1030-32 (1934) [hereinafter Note, Renunci-
ation of Testamentary Gift]; Note, Renunciation of a Devise In Fraud of Creditors as a Fraudulent
Conveyance, 27 VA. L. REV. 936, 941 & n.47 (1941) [hereinafter Note, Renunciation of a
Devise]. Creditors have never pressed a claim of collusive disclaimer successfully in a
reported case. The reliance exception has been successfully pressed to prevent a debtor
who enjoyed the use of property inter vivos, while credit was extended, from disclaiming
it as an inheritance upon the actual owner's death. Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697, 708-09
(1879) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 173-75). The exception has been un-
successfully pressed to prevent disclaimer after a creditor expended legal fees to recover
the inheritance, absent misleading conduct or declaration by the disclaimant concerning
his intention to accept. Schoonover, 193 Iowa at 474, 187 N.W. at 20; Lehr v. Switzer, 213
Iowa 658, 239 N.W. 564 (1931); McGarry v. Mathis, 226 Iowa 37, 282 N.W. 786 (1939).
Quaere whether such a rule could apply to ante-mortem reliance on debtor's status as a
devisee, absent ostensible ownership. See City Nat'l Bank of Birmingham v. Andrews,
355 So. 2d 341, 344 (Ala. 1978) (noting the absence of such reliance without stating the
significance of that finding).
38 In re Wilson's Estate, 298 N.Y. 398,402-06, 83 N.E.2d 852, 854-55 (1948). Some
commentators suggest that this has been the implicit practice in other cases. Newman &
Kalter, Disclaimers of Future Interests: Continuing Problems and Suggested Solutions, 49 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 827, 829-30 (1974).
39 U.S. v. McCrackin, 189 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Ohio 1960); Estate of Hanson, 109 Ill.
594 [Vol. 74:587
THE INSOLVENT HEIR
the disclaimed estate. 40
The ratio decidendum of these cases conforms with traditional dis-
claimer analysis. Opinions refer to disclaimer as a "personal right"
that the devisee's creditors cannot control.4 ' Once the devisee exer-
cises his right to disclaim, the disclaimer "relates back to the date of
the gift, and, as he has never accepted the gift, he has nothing that
could be made the subject of a voluntary conveyance."' 42 Because,
in retrospect, the inheritance never vested in the debtor, no fraudu-
lent transfer of the debtor's property can have occurred. This ap-
proach-permitting insolvent disclaimer with or without the
exceptions noted-represents the most recent judicial pronounce-
ment in the majority of states where the issue has been tried.
Another line of opinions, apparently emanating from a dictum
of Justice Story in 1842, 43 holds insolvent disclaimer to be fraudu-
lent per se.44 These cases rely on the principle that the law must
App. 2d 283, 248 N.E.2d 709 (1969); Tompkins State Bank v. Niles, 160 Ill. App. 3d
226, 231-32, 513 N.E.2d 548, 551-52 (1987).
40 Schoonover, 193 Iowa at 477, 187 N.W. at 23 (disclaimer followed levy of execu-
tion); Lehr, 213 Iowa at 658, 239 N.W. at 564 (disclaimer followed execution sale); Tart,
27 A. at 859 (disclaimer followed sheriff's sale); see Kearley v. Crawford, 112 Fla. 43, 151
So. 293 (1933) (court refused to enjoin execution sale because it would not affect devi-
see's rights). Whether creditors of beneficiaries will be permitted to levy directly against
the decedent's estate depends upon state law. See infra note 274.
41 E.g., Kearley, 112 Fla. at 44, 151 So. at 294; Preece v. Queen, 549 S.W.2d 507,
508 (Ky. 1976); New York Trust Co. v. Halkin, 68 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406 (Sup. Ct. 1936). In
Kearley the court nonetheless denied a petition to enjoin an execution sale following
disclaimer of the devise levied on by the devisee's creditors. For this reason, the case is
sometimes read to stand for the proposition that creditors can defeat an attempted dis-
claimer, e.g., Note, Renunciation of Testamentary Gift, supra note 37, at 1030-31. But Kearley
sounded in equity, and the court simply refused to issue an injunction pending resolu-
tion at common law of the rights of takers in lieu of the disclaimant. The court
grounded its refusal on the principle that an execution sale would be no more of a
"cloud on the property" than the creditor's judgment alone, i.e., the alternative takers'
rights to take against the purchasers would be preserved. 151 So. at 294.
42 E.g., Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 56, 109 S.W. 502, 504 (1907); New York
Trust Co., 68 N.Y.S.2d at 406; Schoonover, 193 Iowa at 477, 187 N.W. at 22. The relation
back fiction is generally needed only for devises of realty. Most American jurisdictions
vest title to personalty in the personal representative pending acceptance by the legatee.
6 W. PAGE, supra note 6, § 59.2, at 378-80, 383-85.
43 Ex Parte Fuller, 9 Fed. Cas. 976, 977 (C.C. Mass. 1842). This was also the civil
law rule, which may well have influenced Story, given his interest in civil law, although
Story's opinion made no reference to it. See Comment, The Oblique Action, 54 TUL. L.
REv. 699 (1980); G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 45 (rev. ed. 1988).
44 Estate ofJensen, 26 Cal. App.3d 474, 481-82, 102 Cal. Rptr. 617, 621 (1972); In
re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401 (1940); Cantrella Estate, 20 Pa. D & C 2d
486 (Phila. County Ct. 1960); Neeld's Estate, 38 Pa. D & C 381 (Phila. County Ct. 1940);
Buckius' Estate, 17 Pa. C. 270 (Phila. County Ct. 1895); In re Estate of Reed, 566 P.2d
587 (Wyo. 1977); Stein v. Brown, 18 Ohio St. 3d 305, 308-09, 480 N.E.2d 1121, 1124
(1985). Kalt has been overruled by statute, and the continued viability of the Penn-
sylvania cases is unclear. See infra notes 59, 62. In Kalt, Stein, and Reed, disclaimer was
disallowed on an "actual intent to defraud" theory, which does not require proof of
insolvency. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act § 7, 7A U.L.A. 509 (1918) [hereinaf-
1989]
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support creditors' efforts to recover from debtors, and that injudg-
ing whether or not a transfer entails a fraud against creditors, courts
should look to the substance rather than to the form of the transfer.
Because the insolvent debtor holds in essence "a limited right of
ownership" over the property disclaimed, irrespective of the fiction
of "relation back," the disclaimer should be set aside as a fraudulent
conveyance. 45 Although this remains the minority rule today, one
modern court perceives a trend in its direction. 46 Still, to date, the
issue has arisen in only a third of the states.47
C. Statutory Solutions
Given the conflicting lines of cases, one might expect that the
movement toward codification of probate law in the last half century
would have served to clarify the rules governing insolvent dis-
claimer.48 Instead, as sometimes happens, the statutory law has
merely added a second layer of uncertainty. One significant devel-
opment has been the passage, in forty-eight states, of disclaimer leg-
islation ending disparate treatment of testate and intestate
beneficiaries. No longer are heirs barred from renouncing per se,
under the anachronistic principle of descent cast.49 But the treat-
ment of creditors' claims under these statutes, now pertinent to
heirs and devisees alike, varies, and the statutes fairly bristle with
ter U.F.C.A.]; see infra note 178. Likewise, a disclaimer in anticipation of forthcoming
insolvency could be deemed fraudulent under U.F.C.A. § 6, 7A U.L.A. 507 (1918). See
Stein v. Brown, 18 Ohio St. 3d at 307 n.1, 480 N.E.2d at 1123 n.1.
45 Exparte Fuller, 9 F. Cas. at 977; In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d at 813, 108 P.2d at
403; Neeld's Estate, 38 Pa. D & C at 386-90; see In re Duffy's Estate, 228 Iowa 426, 445-
46, 292 N.W. 165, 174 (1940) (will contest); Gottstein v. Hedges, 210 Iowa 272, 279-84,
228 N.W. 93, 96-98 (1929) (dissent); In re Wilson's Estate, 298 N.Y. 398, 402-06, 83
N.E.2d 852, 854-55 (1948) (dicta). On the general principle that fraudulent conveyance
analysis should look "to the substance of a transaction, rather than its form," see Bir-
mingham Trust & Sav. Co. v. Shelton, 231 Ala. 62, 67, 163 So. 593, 597 (1935); Kincaid
v. Brown's Estate, 262 S.W.2d 468, 473 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953); Nat'l Bank of Royal Oak v.
Frydlewicz, 67 Mich. App. 417, 425, 241 N.W.2d 471, 475 (1976); Tacoma Ass'n of
Credit Men v. Lester, 72 Wash.2d 453, 455, 433 P.2d 901, 903 (1967) (quote); 1 G.
GLENN, supra note 5, § 195, at 348.
46 Stein, 18 Ohio St. 3d at 307, 480 N.E.2d at 1123.
47 States with cases on point are Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming. Many of the American cases
are collected in Annotation, supra note 30. There are no English cases on point. For the
civil law rule, see supra note 43.
48 On the codification movement, see generally Atkinson, Wanted: A Model Probate
Code, 23J. AM.JUR. Soc'Y 183 (1940); MODEL PROBATE CODE 9-10 (1946) (Introduction).
49 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801(a) (1982). The two remaining states that lack
harmonized disclaimer legislation are New Hampshire and Mississippi. In New Hamp-
shire, the common law distinction is confirmed by case law. Bradley v. State, 100 N.H.




In five jurisdictions, 5a statutes explicitly bar disclaimer by insol-
vent52 beneficiaries. 53 Statutes in other jurisdictions bar disclaimer
against creditors under certain circumstances. 54 Yet many of these
statutes add that they do "not abridge the right of any person, apart
from this chapter, under any existing or future statute or rule of law,
to disclaim any interest."5 5 Read literally, these statutes supplement
50 The exercise of wrestling with these statutes brings to mind Arthur Leff's dictum
that "it is easy to say nothing with words." Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Em-
peror's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 559 (1967). While the disclaimer statutes do
not say nothing, they plainly say not nearly enough.
51 Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Washington. See infra note
53. Three other states have repealed such legislation: Arkansas, Indiana, and Missouri.
See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-102-9 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1-6-4, 30-4-2-3, 30-4-2-
4, repealed by P.L. 293-1983, § 2, 32-3-2-1, 32-3-2-15 (Bums Supp. 1988); Mo. STAT.
§ 474.490, amended by L. 1980, p. 484, § 1 (Vernon's Supp. 1988).
52 With one exception, insolvency is defined in neither the disclaimer statutes
themselves, nor in the definitional sections of the relevant state probate codes. Massa-
chusetts applies the definition contained in the state fraudulent conveyance statute.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191A, § 8(2) (West Supp. 1988). Massachusetts has enacted
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which establishes a definition and mode of
proof of insolvency different from the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, operative in
Florida, Minnesota, and Washington. Cf U.F.C.A. § 2, 7A U.L.A. 442-3 (1918); Uni-
form Fraudulent Transfer Act § 2, id. 648 (1984) [hereinafter U.F.T.A.]. While the Lou-
isiana statute does not expressly require insolvency, the requirement is implicit, and it is
defined according to civil law, see Comment, The Revocatory Action, 9 TUL. L. REV. 422,
424 (1935). It is unclear whether the alternative of asserting fraudulent intent or antici-
pation of insolvency, found in the case law, would be construed as additional grounds
for barring disclaimer under these statutes. See supra note 44. The Massachusetts statute
does preclude these alternatives. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191A, § 8(2) (West
Supp. 1988) (omitting application of U.F.C.A. 99 6-7 to the disclaimer act).
53 FLA. STAT. § 732.801(6)(a) (1987); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 1021 (West 1982);
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 191A, § 8(2) (West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 525.532(6) (West Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.86.060 (West 1987). Lou-
isiana's statutory bar is the oldest by far, dating to 1804, and it derives from the civil law.
See supra note 43. The disclaimer statutes fail to specify what sorts of creditors have
standing to challenge a disclaimer. On this issue, see infra note 299.
54 The Wisconsin statute bars disclaimers by absconded or nonresident benefi-
ciaries, where the creditor has intervened in the probate proceeding to compel repay-
ment. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 858.40(7)(b) (West Supp. 1987). Disclaimer statutes in 40
states bar disclaimer upon judicial sale of the inherited property. This rule follows the
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801(d)(1)(iv) & Comment (1982). Among these statutes, 21
also bar disclaimer upon "other disposition" of the inherited property "pursuant to ju-
dicial process," a phrase that has been interpreted to preclude disclaimer following a
levy by the beneficiary's creditor. Citizens State Bank of Grainfield v. Kaiser, 12 Kan.
App. 2d 530, 750 P.2d 422 (1988) (the language of the NewJersey statute sets out this
rule less ambiguously, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:9-9(a) (West 1983)). Thus, in many states
debtors participate in the "race of diligence" that is ordinarily restricted to creditors:
debtors will rush to disclaim before creditors levy against their inheritance. Cf the (ma-
jority) common law rule, deeming levy and judicial sale ineffective to prevent a dis-
claimer, supra note 40.
55 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.86.080 (West 1987). Disclaimer statutes in fifteen
other states (Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, Missouri, North Carolina, New York, Oklahoma, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont,
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rather than supplant common law rights of disclaimer, and the bar
on disclaimer by insolvents only applies to those beneficiaries as-
serting a statutory right to disclaim.56 If, in fact, the legislative in-
tent was to create "safe harbors" rather than exclusive remedies,
then insolvent heirs in these jurisdictions will surely be estopped
from renouncing, both under the statute and at common law,
whereas insolvent devisees will retain the right to disclaim at common
law if state case law acknowledges this right.57 In this limited re-
spect, the statutes may function to perpetuate the much criticized
distinction between treatment of heirs and devisees that they other-
wise serve to eliminate. 58 It seems unlikely that legislators antici-
pated this outcome; the statutes appear simply to be the product of
artless drafting.
In contrast to these provisions, only two state disclaimer stat-
utes expressly allow insolvent beneficiaries to disclaim an inheri-
tance. 59 The remaining disclaimer statutes are silent on the issue
and thereby leave open the question of how provisions that grant
beneficiaries the right to disclaim should be construed in pari materia
with statutes that bar fraudulent conveyances. While no fraudulent
conveyance statute expressly includes disclaimers within the defini-
tion of "conveyance," the term is nonetheless broadly defined in
every state.60 Thus, instead of resolving the issue, the vast majority
and Wisconsin) use the same or similar language, although two of these statutes ex-
pressly except the statutory bars on disclaimer from the non-exclusivity provision. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191A § 10 (West Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-5-11 (Michie
1984). Cf UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801(e) & Comment (1982), preserving the right to
disclaim under other statutes, but pre-empting common law rights of disclaimer. This
approach is followed in 25 states.
56 Cf Eiseman & Mathis, Estate Planning With Disclaimers in Arkansas, 27 ARK. L. REV.
411, 421-22 (1973); Note, Taxation: Disclaimers Under Federal and Minnesota Law, 51 MINN.
L. REV. 907, 924-25 (1967); Newman & Kalter, The Need for Disclaimer Legislation: An Anal-
ysis of the Background and Current Law, 28 TAx LAw. 592 (1975).
57 There is case law in Florida indicating that an insolvent devisee can disclaim his
devise. Kearley v. Crawford, 112 Fla. 43, 151 So. 293 (1933). There is no case law on
point in Washington or Minnesota, and courts have not construed the statutes in any of
these states. Quaere whether a court would read the legislative rule back into the com-
mon law under these circumstances.
58 E.g., UNIV. PROBATE CODE § 2-801(a) comment (a), general comment to § 2-801
(1982); MODEL PROBATE CODE § 58 comment (1946); T. ATKNSON, supra note 12, at 776;
3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 24, at § 14.15. But see Comment, Descent and
Distribution: Heir Cannot Renounce Share In Intestate's Estate, 28 IOWA L. REV. 700 (1943)
(defending the common law distinction).
59 Maryland and California (expressly overruling In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807,
108 P.2d 401 (1940). MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 9-204(f) (Supp. 1987); CAL.
PROB. CODE § 283 & Comment (West Supp. 1988).
60 As defined in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, in effect in some 17
states, the term "conveyance" "includes every payment of money, assignment, release,
transfer, lease, mortgage or pledge of tangible or intangible property ...." U.F.C.A.
§ 1, 7A U.L.A. 430 (1918). As defined in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, in force
in some 17 other states, the term "transfer" "means every mode, direct or indirect,
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of states have simply codified the pre-existing tension.61 Nor does
legislative history offer much guidance on the question. 62
Under the circumstances, it comes as no surprise that courts
have interpreted these statutes in different ways. In several states,
courts have held the omission of an express bar on disclaimers by
insolvents to imply a legislative intent to permit them.63 Whether
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an
asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, [and] lease .... "
U.F.T.A. § 1 (12), 7A U.L.A. 645 (1984). A comprehensive survey of state fraudulent
conveyance statutes shows that none expressly includes or excludes disclaimers in the
definition of "conveyance." However, cases construing the term "transfer" under the
federal Bankruptcy Code, whose definition is analogous to that of the Uniform Fraudu-
lent Transfer Act, have held the term to include disclaimers. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(5)
(West 1988); In re Peery, 40 Bankr. 811, 814 (M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Watson, 65 Bankr.
9, 11 (C.D. Ill. 1986); cf. Hoecker v. United Bank of Boulder, 476 F.2d 838 (10th Cir.
1973) (defining "transfer" under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 potentially to include dis-
claimers, but giving priority to the state's "relation back" doctrine). Since one of the
purposes of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is to bring state fraudulent convey-
ance law into closer conformity with bankruptcy law, see U.F.T.A., Prefatory Note, 7A
U.L.A. 639 (1984), it seems plausible that the U.F.T.A. will be construed to make insol-
vent disclaimer a fraudulent conveyance. As yet, however, no court has reached this
issue, but see Nielsen v. Cass County Social Service Bd., 395 N.W.2d 157, 159-60 (N.D.
1986) (dictum that an insolvent debtor can disclaim under the Uniform Probate Code;
no discussion of the application of U.F.T.A.; unclear whether the cause of action arose
before or after the passage of U.F.T.A.).
61 In two states the tension is incorporated directly into the disclaimer statute. New
Jersey and Oklahoma each include in their disclaimer statutes a provision barring dis-
claimer whenever such disclaimer violates the state's fraudulent conveyance statute-
without deigning to explain when that is! NJ. STAT. ANN. § 3 B:9-9(d) (West 1983);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84 § 27 (West Supp. 1988). These statutes appear to manifest
both legislative cognizance of the tension and a stubborn unwillingness to resolve it.
62 Because many disclaimer statutes are modeled after the provision contained
within the Uniform Probate Code, its legislative history should be illuminating. Unfor-
tunately, it is ambiguous. An earlier draft of the U.P.C.'s disclaimer section included an
express proclamation of creditors' powerlessness to prevent a disclaimer. W. ROLLISON,
COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 66 (1970). This provision was omitted
from the final draft, which nonetheless included as a comment a statement that "the rela-
tion back is 'for all purposes' which would include, among others for the purpose of
rights of creditors .... [NIumerous cases have held that a devisee or legatee can dis-
claim a devise or legacy despite the claims of creditors." A string-cite follows. UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-801(c) Comment (1982). Whether this comment is intended to indi-
cate that state case law will continue to govern the issue, or whether it is intended to
codify the rule found in the cases cited is unclear. Several of the cases cited include
exceptions in the event of collusion or reliance that are not mentioned in the comment.
Notice also that several states have repealed bars on insolvent disclaimer. See supra note
5 1. In these states there is a stronger inference that the prior rule is pre-empted. That
inference is less clear, however, in states such as Pennsylvania that pass silent disclaimer
statutes with a prior case law tradition of barring insolvent disclaimers. See supra note
44; 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6205, 6206 (Purdon Supp. 1987) (passed in 1976). The
effect of the statute has yet to be unequivocally resolved. See Estate of Clark, 488 Pa. 1, 6
& n.5, 13-14, 410 A.2d 796, 799 & n.5, 801-02 (1980).
63 In re Estate of Colacci, 37 Colo. App. 369, 549 P.2d 1096 (1976); Estate of Schiff-
man, 105 Misc. 2d 1025,430 N.Y.S. 229 (Surr. Ct. 1980); Estate of Oot, 95 Misc. 2d 702,
408 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Surr. Ct. 1978); In re Estate of Dankner, 86 Misc. 2d 1081, 384 N.Y.S.
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this same implication would be read into the statute in the presence
of overt collusion between the disclaimant and the alternative bene-
ficiary, an exception found in the case law of many states, 64 remains
unclear.65 But in other jurisdictions, courts have noted the statutory
conflict and, in the absence of an affirmative expression of legisla-
tive intent, have continued to look to prior case law to resolve the
issue.66 One court has even felt free to overrule prior case law per-
mitting insolvent disclaimer, even after the passage of legislation
granting a right of disclaimer without express limitation.67
In most states disclaimer statutes have abandoned the "reason-
able time" limitation for effective disclaimer, substituting a set dead-
line (ranging from six to ten months). 68 Thus, the possibility that
insolvents will be accorded less time to disclaim than solvent benefi-
ciaries69 does not arise under statutory law. Nonetheless, provisions
in some states that ostensibly continue to permit disclaimer at com-
mon law70 once again raise the possibility that the "reasonable
time" limitation is not pre-empted by the statutory limitation, and
that devisees (but not heirs) could continue to assert the right to
disclaim beyond the statutory period. 71 If so, insolvent devisees
2d 683 (Surr. Ct. 1976); see Gillespie v. Boisseau, 23 Ky. L. R. 1046, 1047, 64 S.W. 730,
731 (Ct. App. 1901).
64 See supra notes 35, 37.
65 At least one case interpreting the statute to permit disclaimer adds the caveat
against collusion. See Estate of Oot, 95 Misc.2d at 705-06, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 305. See also
Disclaimer of Testamentary and Nontestamentary Dispositions-Suggestions for Model Acts, 4 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 658, 667-68 (1969) (committee report on draft of the Uniform
Probate Code's disclaimer provision, suggesting that the exceptions will apply). Notice
that many (but not all) disclaimer statutes bar disclaimer upon acceptance or the receipt
of benefits from a bequest, following the Uniform Probate Code. UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-801(d)(1)(iii) (1982). This provision could be interpreted to cover instances of
collusion.
66 See, e.g., Estate of Hansen, 109 Ill. App. 2d 283, 248 N.E.2d 709 (1969).
67 Stein v. Brown, 18 Ohio St. 3d 305, 480 N.E.2d 1121 (1985).
68 The majority ofjurisdictions set a nine month time limit, following the Uniform
Probate Code. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801(f) (1982). In two jurisdictions the common
law "reasonable time" standard is codified, although nine months is conclusively pre-
sumed to be reasonable. CALIF. PROB. CODE § 279(a) & (b) (West Supp. 1988); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 120.030 & (1) (Michie 1986). In South Carolina, the statute estab-
lishes no time limit; in Pennsylvania the statute expressly permits disclaimer at any time
prior to acceptance. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6206(a) (Purdon Supp. 1988).
69 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. Along with the exclusivity provi-
sions, which vary among states, one must also check time limit provisions which in some
states provide for exclusivity where the general exclusivity provision itself does not, e.g.,
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.11(b)(2) & (h) (McKinney 1981). However, the
issue of the residual applicability of the "reasonable time" rule could arise, e.g., in Con-
necticut, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-300, 45-304 (West Supp. 1988), Missouri, see
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.490(4) & (6) (Vernon Supp. 1988), Rhode Island, see R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 34-5-5, 34-5-11 (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1988), and Indiana, see IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 32-3-2-3(c), 32-3-2-13 (Bums Supp. 1987).
71 Newman & Kalter, supra note 56, at 592.
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might still have to disclaim with greater haste than solvent ones.
In sum, the current state of the law governing insolvent dis-
claimer is unsettled. While commentators sometimes speak of a
"common law" in this area,72 the cases themselves evince more con-
flict than commonality. In most states, the issue has never been re-
solved by judicial decision. And even in states with cases on point,
the passage of muddled legislation has called into question the con-
tinued vitality of earlier precedents. 73 Ironically, the very statutes
that were intended to clarify and simplify the law of disclaimer 74
have, if anything, taken a bad situation and made it worse.
No less striking has been the failure of courts to subject the
problem of insolvent disclaimer to fundamental policy analysis.
Opinions have alternatively applied the literal logic of the "relation
back" doctrine to deny the occurrence of a "transfer, '75 or they
have pierced this fictional veil to recognize that the offer of an inher-
itance does bestow a "right of ownership" that may be the object of
a fraudulent conveyance. 76 The first approach follows from the gen-
eral dictates of gratuitous transfers law that one may accept or reject
an offer of a gratuity at one's pleasure. The second approach fol-
lows from the general dictates of debtor-creditor law that one
should repay one's debts if at all able. What courts thus far have
failed to do is inquire into the underlying functions and objectives
of these two bodies of law in order to resolve the doctrinal conflict
in a principled manner.
D. A Case-Study in Confusion
The analytical poverty of the case law on insolvent disclaimer is
illustrated by a recent New York decision on point. In Matter of
Scrivani,77 a guardian ad litem sought leave to disclaim an inheritance
on behalf of her hospitalized ward. Though not technically insol-
vent, the ward depended upon Medicaid benefits for her support.
The court began by noting that the law of New York ordinarily per-
72 Commentators have not, however, reached a consensus on what exactly the com-
mon law rule is, compare Note, Renunciation of a Legacy or Devise as a Fraudulent Transfer
Under the Bankruptcy Act, 49 IND. L. REV. 290, 298 (1973) ("the common law rule [is] that
the beneficiary of a will may renounce . . .even where the purpose .. . is to avoid
creditors."), with MODEL PROBATE CODE § 58 comment (1946) ("the common law is not
clear as to whether the devisee is able to defeat the rights of creditors."), and with Lewis,
Uncertainty in Disclaimer Laws Creates Problems For Estate Planners, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 419, 458
(1981) ("under the common law a person could not disclaim if the disclaimer would
prejudice the rights of his creditors.").
73 Pennsylvania and Wyoming are two such states. See supra notes 44, 62.
74 Disclaimer of Testamentary and Nontestamentary Dispositions, supra note 65, at 658.
75 See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
76 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
77 116 Misc.'2d 204, 455 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
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mitted disclaimers even when they operated to frustrate creditors'
claims. "At first glance, this rule appears to conflict with long-
standing and well established values, by seeming to encourage the
evasion of one's just debts," the court observed. "Closer analysis
indicates otherwise. Any post mortem distribution... is a donative
transfer like any other. The law forces no one to accept a gift."'78
Having set out the traditional theory of inheritance, the court pro-
ceeded to examine the particular facts of the case. Here, disclaimer
by the devisee would have resulted in her continued dependence
upon Medicaid payments, whereas "the purpose of [Medicaid is] to
aid only economically disadvantaged persons; the economic viability
of the Medicaid program itself can be maintained only if eligibility
requirements are diligently observed." 79 State Medicaid legislation
accordingly denied benefits to persons "who transferred assets
which would otherwise have been available to pay medical costs,"80
just as ordinary creditors could thwart a fraudulent conveyance.
Did a disclaimer constitute a "transfer" for purposes of deter-
mining eligibility for continued Medicaid assistance? The court
held that it did:
While a renunciation, as a formal rejection of a gift, compels the
conclusion that the inheritance never became the property of the
beneficiary, it cannot alter the inheritance's status. It is an incho-
ate property interest, which clearly has value and is available to
the beneficiary; common sense dictates that it cannot be other
than an "available resource" for Medicaid purposes. Thus, while
a renunciation is technically not a transfer of specific property in
which the beneficiary holds title, it is the transfer of a resource.81
On this basis, the court denied the guardian's motion to disclaim,
concluding that it would damage the ward's financial interests by
denying her the right to receive future Medicaid assistance.8 2
The court in Scrivani staunchly maintained that its decision left
standing a competent devisee's right to disclaim: While Medicaid
could deny future eligibility to the disclaimant, it could not compel
acceptance and reimbursement for past support.8 3 This seems, at
best, a nice distinction: Though the competent disclaimant remains
"free" to act, her eligibility for future benefits will be determined as
78 Id. at 208, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
79 Id. at 209, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 509-10.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 211, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 510-11. Contra this result, see Nielsen v. Cass County
Social Servs. Bd., 395 N.W.2d 157 (N.D. 1986).
83 In re Scrivani, 116 Misc. 2d at 209, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 509. Under New York law,
the state can sue for reimbursement if the recipient of welfare acquires property within
ten years of receiving benefits. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW, § 104 (McKinney 1988).
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if the disclaimer had not occurred. Thus, the disclaimant winds up
in essentially the same position as under a rule denying her the right
to disclaim in the first place.84 Furthermore, the justification offered
by the court for this "exception" proves too much. By labelling the
inheritance an "inchoate" interest in property, and recognizing that
the disclaimer of this interest is, in effect, the "transfer of a re-
source,"8 5 the New York court prevented this disclaimer from be-
coming effective on precisely the same theory that courts in other
jurisdictions have invoked to bar insolvent disclaimer generally 86 -
and it did so without so much as a pause for breath after reciting the
formalistic "disclaimer is not a transfer" analysis! 87 Evidently, the
court in Scrivani perceived that insolvent disclaimer should be per-
mitted under some circumstances but not others. Yet, by combining
the traditional general arguments for and against a right of insolvent
disclaimer in order to distinguish specific creditors from one another,
the court lapsed into self-contradiction-without ever acknowledg-
ing, much less addressing, the problematic nature of its reasoning.




Scholarly commentary on insolvent disclaimer is as sparse and
discordant as the case law. Most treatise writers, notably Professors
Simes, Atkinson, and Casner, have sided with the creditors, though
without addressing the merits of the issue at any length.88 When
Professors Simes and Atkinson drafted their Model Probate Code in
1945, they included a provision barring disclaimer by insolvents.8 9
84 This assumes, however, that the disclaimant is in continuing need of medical
care.
85 See supra text accompanying note 81.
86 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
87 See supra text accompanying notes 78, 81. The court was not compelled to reach
this contrary conclusion for reasons of federal pre-emption. The federal Social Security
Act does not require states to deny Medicaid benefits to disclaimants. See In re Scrivani,
116 Misc.2d at 209-10 n.2, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 510 n.2.
88 See infra note 89; 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 24, at § 14.15. For
additional pro-creditor commentary see Note, supra note 72, at 290; Recent Decisions,
37 MIci. L. REV. 1168 (1939); Note, Renunciation of Testamentary Gift, supra note 37, at
1030; Comment, Gifts: Renunciation by Donee: Rights of Donee's Creditors, 18 CALIF. L. REV.
298 (1930); Recent Decision, 29 CAL. L. REV. 531 (1941); Recent Case, 12 Mo. L. REV.
67 (1947); Recent Case, 25 MINN. L. REV. 951 (1941); Howe, Renunciation by the Heir,
Devisee or Legatee, 42 Ky. LJ. 612, 615 (1954); Note, Renunciation of a Devise, supra 37, at
936; Lauritzen, supra note 17, at 587; Recent Decision, 30 ALA. L. REV. 595 (1979); Re-
cent Decision, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 634 (1949); Recent Decision, 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 142
(1941) (by implication); Recent Case, 92 U. PA. L. REV. 105 (1945).
89 MODEL PROBATE CODE § 58 and comment (1946). The code was also drafted by
Professor Paul Basye, then a research associate at the University of Michigan. On the
1989] 603
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The chief critics of this approach have been Professors Fratcher and
Wellman, principal draftsmen of the subsequent Uniform Probate
Code.90 They provided no protection for creditors in their uniform
disclaimer section, although the intended application of the section
in relation to prior case law remains unclear.9 1
In examining the problem of insolvent disclaimer from the per-
spective of public policy, one should emphasize at the outset that
any attempt at substantive analysis must ignore the "confusing and
unnecessary fictions" that have encrusted title theory. 92 These fic-
tions, charting the trajectory of title upon the benefactor's death,
arose to deal with such timely problems as evasion of feudal inci-
dents and the injustice of saddling beneficiaries with burdensome
estates. Creditors' rights were not considered when the fictions
were established. 93 More fundamentally, however, judicial resort to
title theory entails conceptual hazards that might best be avoided by
abolishing it altogether. Asking whether a beneficiary holds "title"
before he disclaims is rather like asking whether a present "interest"
has passed to the cestui of a revocable trust.94 Both are reified ab-
stractions, serving merely to summarize legal rights and relations,
which should come into play (if at all) only after the legal system has
first decided what rights and relations it wishes to create.95 The
drafting history, see id. at 5-12. Cf T. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 775-76 (remarking the
contrary majority rule without comment). The Model Probate Code was widely praised
in its day. See, e.g., Niles, Model Probate Code and Monographs on Probate Law: A Review, 45
MICH. L. REV. 321 (1947).
90 Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1037, 1041 n.12,
1076-77 (1966). Their reasoning is discussed infra notes 212, 234. For additional pro-
debtor commentary, see Recent Case, 6 MINN. L. REV. 608 (1922) (by implication);
Note, Disclaimers As A Postmortem Estate Planning Devise, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 567, 575-76
(1968) [hereinafter Note, Disclaimers]; Note, Renunciation of Testamentary Benefits As Fraudu-
lent Transfer, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 148 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Renunciation]; Recent
Case, 28 IOwA L. REV. 700 (1943); Recent Case, 36 HARV. L. REV. 347 (1922) (by
implication).
91 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801 (1982). See supra note 62. For background on the
drafting of the disclaimer section, see Wellman & Gordon, Uniformity In State Inheritance
Laws: How UPC Article H Has Fared in Nine Enactments, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 357, 357 n.1.
The distinction between the model codes in this respect has sometimes escaped notice.
See Note, Disclaimer Statutes: New Federal and State Tools for Postmortem Estate Planning, 20
WASHBURN L.J. 42, 54 (1980).
92 4 H. TIFFANY, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY § 1058, at 463 (3d ed. 1975). Professor
Tiffany describes the presumption of acceptance of an inheritance by the beneficiary as a
"double fiction," which would make the "relation-back" doctrine nothing less than a
triple fiction! Id. § 1057, at 461.
93 Townson v. Tickell, 106 Eng. Rep. 575, 576, 1814-23 All E.R. Rep. 164, 165
(1819) (Bayley, J.); Martin, supra note 34, at 318-20.
94 The latter question was the ostensible basis for the decision in Farkas v. Wil-
liams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955) and other revocable trust cases, criticized in
Langbein, supra note 32, at 1126-29.
95 The point is recognized in Simes, The Devolution of Title to Appointed Property, 22
ILL. L. REV. 480, 486-87 (1928).
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danger inherent in utilizing such abstractions is that, once estab-
lished, they may continue to govern with their brute logic cases
where the original policy determinants no longer apply. Thus, an
abstraction that begins as a semantic tool may well end as an analyti-
cal crutch.96 Whether courts have fallen into this trap in the area of
disclaimer law remains to be seen. 97 What is clear is that policy ana-
lysts need not tarry long amid the intricacies of title theory. Who-
ever should win, there should the title be.
The analysis that follows approaches the problem of insolvent
disclaimer from three different angles. The first, which I call "do-
minion theory," assesses the property characteristics of an inheri-
tance that the beneficiary wishes to turn down, in order to place it
along a spectrum of property interests, some of which creditors
have traditionally been empowered to reach and others not. The
second, termed "fraud theory," examines more closely how dis-
claimers should be treated in light of the policy goals of debtor-
creditor law generally and fraudulent conveyance law in particular.
Finally, by way of "inheritance theory," the policy goals of gratui-
tous transfers law are entered into the equation.
A. Dominion Theory and the Problem of Analogy
Grant Gilmore once observed, with his usual acuity, that "Law-
yers have a professionally inbred passion for speculating on the
'true nature' of things. The legal mind is never satisfied until the
novel or unfamiliar has been classified as being 'like' some recog-
nized category of the known and familiar. ... 98 In this tradition,
some courts have searched for "analogous precedents in our law" 99
to determine whether an insolvent disclaimer should be effective
against creditors. Analogical reasoning in fact appears on both
sides of the insolvent disclaimer controversy. On the one hand, at
least one opinion upholding the insolvent's right to disclaim has
96 Judge Cardozo once made the same observation with respect to the legal abstrac-
tion's close relative, the legal metaphor: "Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched,
for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it." Berkey v.
Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926). Similar alarms have been
rung in other disciplines. See, e.g., Lightman, Magic on the Mind: Physicists' Use of Metaphor,
58 AM. SCHOLAR 97, 101 (1989).
97 Some commentators have criticized cases permitting insolvent disclaimer by vir-
tue of the "relation back" fiction on the ground that the reasoning is "largely concep-
tual," "stretch[ing] logic to a fragile tenuity." Note, Renunciation of Testamentary Gift,
supra note 37, at 1032; Note, Renunciation of a Devise, supra note 37, at 943; see also Recent
Decision, 18 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 142, 144 (1941); Recent Case, 12 Mo. L. REV. 69 (1947);
Recent Decision, 37 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1170 (1939). Still, the justifications for this
approach lie also in the general dictates of inheritance law, not merely in the tenuous
logic of title theory.
98 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 987-88 (1965).
99 Recent Decision, 24 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 636 (1949).
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equated disclaimer of an inheritance with refusal to accept an inter
vivos gift. 00 Cases have uniformly affirmed the donee's right to de-
cline a gift under all circumstances.'10 On the other hand, opinions
challenging the debtor's right to disclaim have compared disclaimer
to the assignment of an inheritance. 0 2 It is equally well settled that
assignment of an inheritance by an insolvent constitutes a fraudu-
lent conveyance.' 03 Moving to a cognate field of doctrine, still an-
other case has analogized a disclaimer to the exercise of a general
power of appointment. 0 4 Again, it is settled law that creditors can
reach property subject to a general power that the debtor has exer-
cised, whether or not he is himself the appointee. 0 5
Each of the "analogous" doctrines cited in these cases has tra-
ditionally been justified on a property interest theory. The intended
100 "The power of a legatee to refuse is, then, precisely the same as that of a donee
of a gift inter vivos, and, of course, it is perfectly evident that if such a donee refuses to
accept the gift his creditors are completely powerless to compel his acceptance." In re
Wilson's Estate, 298 N.Y. 398,406, 83 N.E.2d 852, 856 (1949) (Fuld,J., dissenting). For
a commentator's like argument, see Note, Disclaimers, supra note 90, at 575-76.
101 Stoehr v. Miller, 296 F. 414,425 (2d Cir. 1923); Lockard v. Stephenson, 120 Ala.
641, 645-46, 24 So. 996, 997 (1899) (dicta); Gottstein v. Hedges, 210 Iowa 272, 276,
228 N.W. 93, 94 (1929) (dissent); Succession of Henican, 248 So. 2d 385, 387 (La.
1971); In re Shepard's Estate, 170 Pa. 323, 328, 32 A. 1040, 1041 (1895) (dicta); Lynch v.
Lynch, 201 S.C. 130, 145, 21 S.E.2d 567, 575 (1942).
102 See, e.g., Buckius' Estate, 17 Pa. C. 270, 272 (Phila. County Ct. 1895) ("It is also
very clear that the legatee, as against the rights of his attaching creditors, cannot waive
the bequest any more than he could assign the legacy subsequent to the service of the
attachment."); In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 108 P.2d 401, 403 (1940) ("By
renouncing the legacy he conveys away the property as effectively as if he had assigned
his interest to the ultimate recipient."). See also Neeld's Estate, 38 Pa. D & C 381, 389
(Phila. County Ct. 1940) (analogy to a "release"); Stein v. Brown, 18 Ohio St. 3d 305,
308, 480 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (1985) (analogy to a "transfer"). Cf infra note 111 (cases
distinguishing disclaimer and assignment). For commentary asserting the same equation,
see Recent Case, 25 MINN. L. REV. 951, 952-53 (1941). One case has turned the equa-
tion around, asserting that precedent permitting insolvent disclaimer serves to support a
right of insolvent assignment. See In re Murphy's Estate, 217 Iowa 1291, 252 N.W. 523
(1934).
103 McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 23 Tenn. App. 434, 134 S.W.2d 197 (1939); In
re Wilson's Estate, 298 N.Y. 398, 404, 83 N.E.2d 852, 855 (1949) (dicta); see also cases
cited in Annotation, supra note 29, at 46-48; infra note 110 (family settlements). Virtu-
ally every modern disclaimer statute bars the right to disclaim upon assignment. See
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801 (d)(1) (1982). But see Murphys Estate, 217 Iowa at 1291, 252
N.W. at 523 (dicta), overruled by IOWA CODE ANN. § 733.704(4) (West Supp. 1989).
104 "The principle that the exercise of a general power of appointment by a debtor
may be a fraudulent conveyance as to his creditors clearly supports the rule we adopt in
the present case .. ." Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d at 812, 108 P.2d at 403. At least one
commentator anticipated the Kalt opinion in positing this analogy. Comment, supra note
88, at 300-01 ("a somewhat analogous situation"). The Kalt analogy is approved in Re-
cent Decision, 23 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 634, 636 (1949); Note, Renunciation of a Devise, supra
note 37, at 944.
105 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 945, at 399-400 (1956);
5 W. PAGE, supra note 6, § 45.24, at 569-70; Annotation, 59 A.L.R. 1510 (1929); Annota-
tion, 97 A.L.R. 1071 (1935); Annotation, 121 A.L.R. 803 (1939).
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donee of a gift owns nothing until such time as he accepts; his credi-
tors therefore have no interest in an "inoperative" gift.' 0 6 By con-
trast, the devisee who assigns his inheritance, by his very act of
assignment, makes "an unequivocal assertion of title, which by nec-
essary implication affirms his acceptance."' 107 How does a dis-
claimer compare to the refusal of a gift and to the assignment of an
inheritance from the standpoint of property ownership? In order
to answer this question substantively, we must take a closer look at
the extent of the disclaimant's dominion over the disclaimed prop-
erty, for that provides the true measure of his interest. Shorn of the
formalities of title, the essence of property is power.108
One element of dominion that the disclaimant does possess is
the power to capture the corpus and convert it to his own use. Un-
like the holder of a special power of appointment, for example, the
disclaimant could, by perfunctory action, accept his inheritance and
apply it to his debts. In this respect, the disclaimant's dominion is
equivalent to that of both a declining donee and an assignor, sug-
gesting an identity of interest that the law thus far has seen fit to
ignore. 09 However, there may be additional elements of dominion
that serve to distinguish the disclaimant from other sorts of
beneficiaries.
The crucial element to explore in this regard is the extent of
dominion exercised by the act of disclaimer itself. Consider, at one
extreme, the refusal to accept an inter vivos gift. By his act of re-
fusal, the declining donee restores the status quo ante. The donor can
now do with the property what he will, and the donee has disabused
himself of all power to control its subsequent disposal. At the other
extreme, consider the assignment of an inheritance. By his act of
assignment, the assignor does not restore the status quo. Rather, he
106 E.g., Gottstein v. Hedges, 210 Iowa 272, 275, 228 N.W. 93, 94 (1929).
107 See, e.g., McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 23 Tenn. App. 434, 446, 134 S.W.2d
197, 205 (1939). See also Disclaimer of Testamentary and Nontestamentary Dispositions, supra
note 65, at 659-60 (exercise of "[a] power to re-direct seems to ... imply acceptance of
the legacy.").
108 See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil Code, in I THE WORKS OF JEREMY BEN-
THAM 308 (1. Bowring ed. 1962) ("The idea of property consists in ... the persuasion of
power to derive certain advantages from the object, according to the nature of the
case.").
109 As we have noted, creditors are denied the right to reach an inter vivos gift that
the debtor could have accepted but declined, whereas creditors can reach a gift or be-
quest that the debtor could have accepted but instead assigned. See supra notes 101, 103.
Notice also the asymmetrical treatment of general powers of appointment from this
standpoint. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. Nor has the absence of a power
to capture been invariably dispositive; while creditors cannot reach property over which
the debtor holds a special power of appointment, see 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 24, at § 23.15, certain creditors may be permitted to levy against the corpus of
a spendthrift trust that the debtor cannot reach himself. See infra note 162.
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chooses to control the ultimate disposition of the property, and, by
unanimous decision, courts deem this power the equivalent of a cap-
ture of the property for the assignor's own purposes."t 0
Now consider the devisee who disclaims his inheritance. It is
readily apparent that this act lies between the two extremes. The
disclaimant has no power to channel the inheritance to chosen tak-
ers in lieu of himself. But because the testator is dead, the devisee's
disclaimer cannot restore the status quo. By examining the will (in
conjunction with the disclaimer and antilapse statutes), the devisee
is always able to determine who will receive the property in the
event that he disclaims. Thus, while the disclaimant does not con-
trol the disposition of the property as he does when he assigns it, he
can anticipate its disposition as he cannot when he declines an inter
vivos gift. I call this sort of transfer a "quasi-conveyance." Given its
intermediate character, analogies to the refusal of a gift and to the
assignment of an inheritance appear equally inapposite, at least with
respect to the action involved."'
By the same token, the equation of a disclaimer with the exer-
cise of a general power of appointment is also inapt. The holder of
the power, like the assignor of a devise, is channelling the corpus to
his preferred recipients. In fact, courts have failed to identify the
disclaimer's closest analogue from the standpoint of dominion the-
ory: namely, a general power of appointment that the holder of the
power declines to exercise. 1 2 Like a devise, the corpus of such a
1 10 See supra note 103. Similarly, family settlement agreements, whereby benefi-
ciaries arrange an alternative disposition of the estate, have been ineffective to avoid
creditors' claims; here again, the devisees control the ultimate disposition of the estate
assets. Seeley v. Seeley, 242 Iowa 220, 45 N.W.2d 881 (1951); Shedenhelm v. Cafferty,
174 Iowa 195, 156 N.W. 340 (1916); Cantrella Estate, 20 D & C 2d 486 (Phila. County
Ct. 1960); Petrides v. Park Hill Restaurant, 293 A.D. 509, 39 N.Y.S.2d 645 (App. Div.
1943); Niklason v. Ramsey, 233 Va. 161, 353 S.E.2d 783 (1987). Contra In re Murphy's
Estate, 217 Iowa 1291, 252 N.W. 523 (1934) (dicta).
11 1 For cases recognizing the conceptual distinctions between a disclaimer and an
assignment, see Estate of Schiffman, 105 Misc. 2d 1025, 1027-28, 430 N.Y.S.2d 229, 231
(Surr. Ct. 1981); McQuiddy, 23 Tenn. App. at 441, 134 S.W.2d at 204-05; Schoonover v.
Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 477, 187 N.W. 20, 22 (1922); Nielsen v. Cass County Social
Services Bd., 395 N.W.2d 157, 160 (N.D. 1986). Still, confusion over these concepts
persists. One court, for example, has stated in the context of disclaimer that "when a
testator dies, the legatee obtains a power... to determine the ultimate disposition of the
property regardless of acceptance on his part." In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 811,
108 P.2d 401, 403 (1940). This confusion is also reflected in other rules, such as the
doctrine found in some states that a devisee cannot disclaim an (unassignable) spend-
thrift trust. This doctrine is criticized in A. Scoir, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 337.7, at 2682-
83 (1967), and has been abolished under many, but not all, state statutes. See UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-801(d)(2) (1982); Annotation, 14 A.L.R.3d 1437 (1967).
112 Cf Comment, supra note 88, at 300-01 & nn.16-17; Note, Renunciation of a Devise,
supra note 37, at 944-45; Note, Renunciation, supra note 90, at 156-57. Professor Howe
argues that the analogy to an exercised power is more appropriate than the analogy to
an unexercised power because both a disclaimer and the exercise of a power involve
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power may be captured by its holder; and like a disclaimed devise,
the corpus of an unexercised power will flow to takers in default of
appointment chosen by the donor of the power, but known to the
holder of the power. This too is a quasi-conveyance.
At common law, creditors may levy against the corpus of an ex-
ercised power but not against property subject to an unexercised
power. However, eleven states have reversed the latter rule by stat-
ute.11 3 Dominion theory suggests that the treatment of unexercised
powers should coincide with the treatment of disclaimers, although
in practice no such symmetry has developed.' 14 These two areas of
the law have evidently evolved independently of one another.' 15 At
the same time, dominion theory suggests another symmetry that
does exist pervasively between the rules governing collusive dis-
claimers and assignments. Under the "collusion exception" found
in much of the case law, creditors can set aside insolvent disclaimers
that are accompanied by collusion between the disclaimant and the
alternative beneficiary. 1 6 In such an instance, the disclaimant con-
trols the ultimate disposition of the inheritance, just as he would if
he had assigned it. 117 Because creditors can also levy against an as-
signed inheritance,' 18 the two rules are harmonious from the stand-
point of dominion theory.
But, at the end of the day, how useful is dominion theory?
While it provides a means of comparative analysis, so cherished by
lawyers, dominion theory offers no basis for selecting the incidents
of control that are to be adjudged definitive of ownership. While we
might light upon the presence of "channelling" to establish owner-
ship, in which respect assignment differs from non-collusive dis-
claimer, we might just as easily make the "power to capture"
dispositive, in which event all the interests considered here would
acts, whereas an unexercised power involves afailure to act. Howe, supra note 88, at 612.
This distinction, however, is merely formal and insignificant, for a failure to act (an
omission) is itself a form of commission and is indistinguishable from the standpoint of
dominion or any other policy concern. See, e.g., Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Frag-
ment, 94 YALE LJ. 1855, 1906 (1985) (see "act").
113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 13.2 (1977).
114 For example, in New York creditors can reach the corpus of an unexercised gen-
eral power of appointment but they cannot prevent a disclaimer. In Ohio, the reverse is
true. Cf supra notes 63, 67, 113.
115 The common law of powers emerged out of agency law. See 2 L. SIMES & A.
SMrrH, supra note 105, §§ 944-45; 5 W. PAGE, supra note 6, § 45.24, at 568-71.
116 See supra notes 35, 37.
117 Similarly, if through collusion the disclaimant can capture the benefit of an in-
heritance surreptitiously for himself, then he has, in effect, accepted it (or exercised a
general power of appointment in favor of himself). For other theoretical perspectives
on the collusion exception, see infra text accompanying notes 176-83.
118 See supra note 103.
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constitute "owned" property.' 19 In order to develop a reasoned ap-
proach to the problem of disclaimer, we must look beyond the mate-
rial attributes of dominion to the functional attributes of debtor-
creditor law and gratuitous transfers law. Such an inquiry may re-
veal a rational line of cleavage between "owned" and "unowned"
property-or it may even indicate that a consistent line of cleavage
under dominion theory is inconsistent with the goals of public
policy.
B. Fraud Theory and the Problem of Reliance
Within the broad parameters of debtor-creditor law, the sub-
category of fraudulent conveyance law governs the conduct of debt-
ors. Virtually every state has passed a fraudulent conveyance statute
permitting creditors to avoid transfers that "delay, hinder, or de-
fraud" them.' 20 Whether insolvent disclaimers should be so classi-
fied depends upon the purposes that the doctrine is intended to
serve. As will be shown, our answer may hinge on the nature of the
debtor-creditor relationship at issue in any given case.
1. Voluntary Creditors
Assuming that a creditor has voluntarily extended credit to a
debtor, we begin with the premise that the transaction which has
occurred is, in its essence, commercial. Some commentators refer
to the debtor's "moral" obligations to his creditors, the principal
one being to repay his debts if it is humanly possible to do so.1 21
From this perspective one might conclude that any conduct by the
debtor which needlessly reduces his creditors' opportunity for re-
covery (including disclaimer) violates the moral underpinnings of
119 Some commentators have taken the latter position, arguing that "the power to
acquire ownership" constitutes "the practical equivalent of ownership." 4 RESTATEMENT
OF PROPERTY ch. 25, at 1813-14 (introductory note) (1936) (discussing powers of ap-
pointment); see also 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 24, at §§ 23.4, 23.17
(same); Note, Renunciation of a Devise, supra note 37, at 942-43 (discussing disclaimers);
Martin, supra note 34, at 358-39 (discussing tax treatment).
120 The quoted language appeared in the original fraudulent conveyance statute, 13
Eliz:, ch. 5 (1571), and was carried forward (with minor rewording) into the U.F.C.A.
§ 7, 7A U.L.A. 509 (1918) and U.F.T.A. § 4, id. at 652 (1984).
121 E.g., John Chipman Gray: "If there is one sentiment therefore, which it would
seem to be the part of all in authority, and particularly of all judges, to fortify, it is the
duty of keeping one's promises and paying one's debts." J. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE
ALIENATION OF PROPERTY at iii (2d ed. 1895). This principle, Professor Gray felt, was "fit
to produce a manly race, based on sound morality and wise philosophy." Id. at v. See
also Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505, 510-13 &
n.17 (1977) (defining fraudulent conveyance law in terms of moral obligation); Recent
Decision, 27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 659, 662 (1952) (applying moral theory to creditor's
standing to contest a will).
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their transaction. 122 It is submitted that this viewpoint, promul-
gated in at least one opinion, 123 fundamentally misconstrues the na-
ture of the consensual debtor-creditor relationship. To be sure,
some persons extend credit for reasons of friendship or family con-
nection rather than profit, and these transactions may take on a
moral tone. More often than not, however, loans within the family
are not formalized in law. Creditors' rights in this context are
shaped by extra-legal norms (and enforced by extra-legal sanctions)
that fully reflect the transaction's moral character.
In the main, formalized extension of credit is a business. Com-
mercial lenders loan money at interest for the purpose of profit, 124
fully cognizant that some debtors will default. Commercial lenders de-
mand interest rates that reflect their risk, and they protect them-
selves against random losses either by obtaining bad-debt insurance
or by risk-spreading. The basis for most formal credit transactions
is thus contractual, not moral; such transactions are the product of
arms' length bargaining between parties holding adverse economic
interests, and the creditor's rights of recovery flow from agreement
rather than naturaljustice. When a creditor, for example, agrees to
a limited recourse loan (thereby increasing his risk, presumably in
exchange for some compensating benefit), he cannot reasonably
press a claim for full recourse upon the moral principle that debtors
should repay what they borrow. The creditor assumed the risk as a
matter of business judgment; if that judgment proves to be sound,
he will profit in the aggregate, notwithstanding incidental default.125
122 Thus, one commentator condemns insolvent disclaimer as "morally wrong," its
legality leading to "inequitable results." Note, Renunciation of a Devise, supra note 37, at
938-39. On the same basis, other scholars have condemned the effectiveness of spend-
thrift trusts, see J. GRAY, supra note 121, at iii-x, creditors' inability to levy against an
unexercised power of appointment, see Berger, The General Power ofAppointment as an Inter-
est in Property, 40 NEB. L. REv. 105, 119 (1960), and rules which (in some states) deny
creditors the right to contest a will disinheriting their debtor, see Recent Decision, supra
note 121, at 659, 662. Rules governing will contests are discussed infra text accompany-
ing note 272-304.
123 "As an honest debtor, he must desire, that his creditors should derive as much
benefit from all his 'rights of property' as is possible." Ex Parte Fuller, 9 Fed. Cas. 974,
976 (C.C. Mass. 1842) (dictum by Story, J., that a disclaimer in bankruptcy would be
fraudulent); cf In re Scrivani, 116 Misc. 2d 204, 208, 455 N.Y.S.2d 505, 509 (Sup. Ct.
1982).
124 This is generally true even of purchase-money creditors, selling goods or serv-
ices on credit. See Welshans, Using Credit for Profit Making, 45 HARV. Bus. REV. 141 (Jan.-
Feb. 1967). But even when purchase-money credit is offered at "bargain" rates (as some
automobile manufacturers have done of late), the profit derived from extending credit is
hidden in the purchase price. Therefore, no moral or economic distinction need be
drawn between purchase-money creditors and commercial lenders.
125 See generally P. SMITH, CONSUMER CREDIT COSTS, 1949-59 (1964). In a provoca-
tive article, Professor Countryman argues that where credit is extended without proper
investigation of the debtor's credit-worthiness (which he believes to be common), the
creditor bears moral responsibility when the debtor defaults. Countryman proposes
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If one accepts the proposition that commercial lenders take cal-
culated risks, and that no moral indignation need accompany de-
fault, then the question of what sorts of conduct "delay, hinder, or
defraud" creditors can be simply answered: any conduct contrary to
what the parties have themselves agreed upon. Creditors, in con-
senting to lend money (and debtors, in consenting to borrow it) may
generally set whatever terms they desire-the interest rate will fluc-
tuate accordingly. 126 It would be inefficient, however, to require the
parties to negotiate over every detail of the contract for credit. That
is where fraudulent conveyance law comes in. Fraudulent convey-
ance law serves to provide a set of "boilerplate" provisions, read
into every contract for credit, that creditors and debtors would gen-
erally agree upon. For those creditors and debtors who seek greater
(or lesser) protection, the avenue of additional negotiation remains;
however, by implying those contractual provisions that most credi-
tors and debtors are presumed to want, fraudulent conveyance law
serves to reduce transaction costs. 1 2 7
Consider, by way of illustration, the classic case of the insolvent
debtor who makes (rather than receives) a gratuitous transfer.
Would creditors generally be willing to grant their debtor leave to
divest himself of assets past the point of insolvency-that is, to give
away all or part of (what is in effect) the corpus of the loan itself?.
Plainly not: Creditors rely on the opportunity to recover this corpus
when they establish the price of credit. Were the debtor empow-
ered spontaneously to reduce to zero his creditors' opportunity for
recovery via gift giving, the transaction would become in effect a no
recourse loan. All lenders would insist on including a provision
against such conduct in every loan agreement before extending
credit at a finite interest rate. Fraudulent conveyance law eliminates
the need for such a provision by permitting creditors to set aside the
insolvent debtor's gratuities. 128
By contrast, an insolvent debtor's refusal to accept a gratuitous
transfer does not reduce his creditors' opportunities for recovery. It
simply fails to increase them. Of course, creditors may still wish to
that improvident credit extension be made a complete defense to recovery and even a
cause of action for consequential damages. Countryman, Improvident Credit Extension: A
New Legal Concept Aborning?, 27 ME. L. REV. 1, 6-7, 17 (1975).
126 There are, of course, several restraints imposed upon the parties' freedom of
contract, such as usury laws and rules which deny debtors the right to waive ex ante the
discharge in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(a) (West 1988). These restraints apply
when other policy considerations come into play.
127 This synopsis of the function of fraudulent conveyance law follows Baird &Jack-
son, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 829-36
(1985). See also Clark, supra note 121, at 544. For a criticism of this model, see Carlson,
Is Fraudulent Conveyance Law Efficient?, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 643 (1987).
128 U.F.C.A. § 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1918); U.F.T.A. § 5, id. at 657 (1984).
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take into consideration such prospects for spontaneous aggrandize-
ment when they extend credit. Creditors may be able thereby to
offer their debtors a lower rate of interest. But unless most credi-
tors would wish to do so, conduct thwarting recovery from such
sources should not constitute a fraudulent conveyance.
Would creditors, then, generally wish to rely on (that is, have
recourse to) a debtor's inheritance prospects when they set the price
of credit? A moment's reflection suggests that they would not. Few
debtors have the requisite information at their fingertips; efforts to
obtain the information would be inefficient, significantly increasing
transaction costs. 1 29 Moreover, even in the unlikely event that such
information were cheaply available-say, if the debtor's family had a
long-standing financial relationship with the creditor, or if the
debtor's inheritance prospects were notorious-there remains the
problem of valuing these expectancies.130 A will is ambulatory, and
while the life-span of the testator can be actuarially estimated,
thereby indicating the extent to which interests created under the
will must be discounted, the probability that the testator will revoke
his will before it "matures" depends upon idiosyncrasy, and hence is
indeterminate. Indeed, insolvency and the likelihood of revocation
are not independent variables. If the option of post-mortem estate
planning (via disclaimer) were foreclosed, the likelihood of pre-
mortem estate planning (via disinheritance or spendthrift provision)
would rise accordingly. Thus, the protection afforded creditors by a
debtor's inheritance prospects, even if cheaply determinable, would
remain largely illusory.' 3 '
129 Because wills are private documents prior to probate, creditors cannot routinely
determine their contents; nor, for that matter, can beneficiaries. On the impracticality of
such investigations by creditors, see generally 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note
24, § 26.100, at 546; E. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS 637 (2d ed. 1947). While the
monetary information costs would probably be lower for debtors than for creditors,
there might well be additional "interpersonal" costs to such investigations by
beneficiaries.
130 This point is noted in Lockard v. Stephenson, 120 Ala. 641, 642, 24 So. 996,
996-97 (1898); In re Shepard's Estate, 170 Pa. 323, 327, 32 A. 1040, 1041 (1895); see In re
Seal, 261 F. 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1919) (noting the possibility of subsequent disinheritance).
131 See infra text accompanying notes 213, 225-26. An analogy may be drawn here
between permitting disclaimer on this basis and permitting insolvents a discharge in
bankruptcy: labor and insolvency are also dependent variables. The insolvent whose
future wages can be garnished will choose to consume leisure (and welfare benefits)
instead. Thus creditors cannot realistically rely on an insolvent's future wages. SeeJack-
son, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1433-34 (1985). The
analysis of creditor reliance presented in the text appears equally pertinent to disclaim-
ers of non-probate assets and inter vivos gifts. See supra note 32 and text accompanying
note 101. On the other hand, the obscurity and illusory character of expectancies serve
to distinguish them from general powers of appointment under fraud theory, even as we
equated them under dominion theory. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14. On
the basis of fraud theory, one might well conclude that creditors ought to be able to
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Turning from the abstract to the concrete, evidence indicates
that creditors ordinarily show little interest in their debtors' expec-
tancies.' 32 Consumer credit dossiers normally report the debtor's
credit history, income, assets, debts and obligations. 133 Creditors
who finance large purchases generally protect themselves by de-
manding a security interest in collateral and consequently can disre-
gard the debtor's other resources.134 If creditors stood in a position
to prevent disclaimers by insolvents they would receive, literally,
more than they bargained for: The expectancy of inheritance will
not be reflected in the price of credit. 135
There is, however, a possible rejoinder to all of this. In a world
of perfect, or cost-free, information, creditors would negotiate a
personal interest rate for each debtor, reflecting his individual likeli-
hood of default. But because information in the real world comes at
a price, creditors find it more efficient to aggregate risk among debt-
ors, offering credit to all at the same "pre-packaged" rate; or, at
most, a creditor will establish several classes of debt, offering a pref-
erential rate to those who qualify. In this way, creditors reduce sub-
stantially their transaction costs. 136
reach an unexercised general power of appointment, since this is an identifiable tangible
asset creditors can efficiently rely on.
132 E.g., City Nat'l Bank of Birmingham v. Andrews, 355 So. 2d 341, 344 (Ala. 1978);
cf. Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697, 707 (1879); Seal, 261 F. at 112. Of course, this want of
concern might stem from the majority rule permitting insolvent disclaimer, though even
under such a rule the prospect of a "bailout" by family members could prompt a credi-
tor's attention. Professor Wellman recalls that creditors' lobbies showed little interest in
the drafting of the Uniform Probate Code, even with regard to its creditor non-claim
provisions, though they were invited to participate. Telephone interview with Richard
Wellman, Professor of Law, University of Georgia (April, 1988).
133 Some dossiers are more rudimentary than others. On investigations of credit-
worthiness, see Rule, Caplovitz & Barker, The Dossier in Consumer Credit, in ON RECORD:
FILES AND DOSSIERS IN AMERICAN LIFE esp. 153-54 (S. Wheeler ed. 1969); Countryman,
The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal Dossier and the Computer, 49 TEX. L. REV. 837,
839-42 (1971); Countryman, supra note 125, at 2-6; Hersbergen, The Improvident Extension
of Credit as an Unconscionable Contract, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 225, 267-69 (1974).
134 This is almost always true of residential real estate financing, for example.
135 One court has proscribed insolvent disclaimer on the ground that permitting it
would result in a "windfall" to the ultimate recipient, and a concomitant "depriv[ation]"
of creditors. In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 108 P.2d 401, 403 (1940); for
commentary in accord, see Note, Renunciation of Testamentary Gift, supra note 37, at 1032;
Note, supra note 72, at 304. This analysis, however, fails to take into consideration credi-
tors' lack of reliance on expectancies when they establish the price of credit. Having set
a higher interest rate on this account, creditors would be the ones receiving a "windfall"
if they could capture their debtors' expectancies! Cf Fratcher, supra note 90, at 1077.
136 Alternatively, different creditors may specialize in offering credit to a single class
of borrowers who qualify for their set rate. On patterns of rate-setting, see REPORT OF
THE NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FIN., CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 112-13 (1972).
See also Countryman, supra note 125, at 1-7 (suggesting that creditors frequently pay little
attention to credit-worthiness, relying on "volume rather than on thorough credit inves-
tigation."). Cf Hallinan, The "Fresh Start'" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inven-
tory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 105-06 & n.236 (1986).
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While creditors could never efficiently determine the value of
each debtor's expectancies, they might be able to calculate at little
cost the aggregate value of those expectancies and then factor their
collective impact on credit risk into the set price of credit. If credi-
tors followed such a strategy, interest rates would in fact respond to
laws granting or denying the right of insolvent disclaimer. A rule
permitting insolvent disclaimer would, however, raise interest rates
for all borrowers within a given class, and debtors who stood to in-
herit less (tending to be poorer overall) would bear part of the bur-
den of a rule benefiting debtors who stood to inherit more (being
wealthier on the whole).137 In short, by creating a right of insolvent
disclaimer, lawmakers would effect a wealth transfer from poorer to
richer debtors.
This argument, which commentators have offered mutatis mutan-
dis to attack the public utility of spendthrift trusts, ' 3 8 might be tested
empirically. Given the inverse relationship between insolvency and
inheritance, it remains unclear whether creditors would place any
value at all on their debtor's prospects of inheritance, and therefore
whether a rule permitting insolvent disclaimer would have any mea-
surable impact on interest rates.' 3 9 But even if such effects could be
demonstrated, proponents of the argument have garbled their eco-
nomics. The wealth transfer they decry is actually an efficient one.
The key to this efficiency lies in the fact that the market for credit is
already imperfect due to the cost of debtor differentiation. The mo-
ment creditors set a pre-packaged rate of interest for all debtors, the
total demand for credit drops from its Pareto-optimal maxima.
Poorer debtors, who are likelier to default, tend to borrow more,
attracted by an aggregated rate that is lower than the one they could
obtain in the event of differentiation. But more affluent debtors
borrow still less, because the aggregated rate is higher than they
would otherwise have to pay. Wealthier debtors thus subsidize
credit to poorer debtors as a necessary consequence of the high
137 Studies show a positive correlation between income, overall wealth, and inheri-
tance in America; it is generally agreed that inheritance contributes to economic dispari-
ties. See, e.g., L. THUROW, GENERATING INEQUALITY 129-31 (1975).
138 See Bushman, The (In)validity of Spendthrift Trusts, 47 OR. L. REV. 304, 312, 315-17
(1968); see also Callahan, Trusts and Succession, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 663, 694 (1976). The
problem posed by spendthrift trusts is in this respect closely analogous to the problem
of disclaimer; both devices offer protection that varies with the wealth of the debtor.
139 The experimental stumbling block here lies in the difficulty of controlling for
other variables which may also influence interest rates, although it might still be possible
to design a suitable regression analysis. For general discussions of the responsiveness of
interest rates to legal change, see Meckling, Financial Markets, Default and Bankruptcy: The
Rule of the State, 41 LAw & CoNmMP. PROB. 13, 19-24 (1977); Weston, Some Economic
Fundamentals for an Analysis of Bankruptcy, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 47, 48-51 (1977);
Shuchman, Theory and Reality in Bankruptcy: The Spherical Chicken, 41 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 66, 68-83, 89-91 (1977).
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price of the information needed to distinguish them.140
Now consider again the matter of disclaimer. If insolvent dis-
claimer is impermissible, the price of credit will (by hypothesis)
drop, but the distortion caused by aggregated rates will increase. As
a result, poorer debtors will have a marginally greater incentive to
borrow, at rates reduced further by richer debtors' inheritance pros-
pects. But those richer debtors will wish to borrow even less, de-
spite the offer of lower rates, because now their expectancies will be
at risk, a risk for which the lower rates do not completely
compensate. 141
By comparison, a rule permitting insolvent disclaimer should
spur aggregate borrowing, even though it will cause interest rates to
rise. This is so because the distortive subsidy from richer to poorer
debtors under set interest rates will be reduced. Put simply, when-
ever one is faced with the market imperfection of undifferentiated
consumer prices, one can increase market efficiency by equalizing
suppliers' costs. A rule permitting disclaimer is a step in this direc-
tion, making debtors of unequal means more equally likely to de-
fault. 142 This procrustean solution to the problem of
undifferentiated prices is, in fact, a good illustration of what econo-
mists call the principle of the "second best": When a market is sad-
dled with imperfections, the introduction of additional
imperfections may actually improve market efficiency. 143 While
140 This phenomenon, known to economists as the problem of "adverse selection,"
also occurs in connection with other markets, e.g., the insurance market. See R. COOTER
& T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMicS 66-67 (1988); G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS
60-64 (1970); Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521,
1540-46 (1987).
141 This analysis assumes that disclaimants can effectively enjoy the benefits of their
disclaimed inheritance, as can the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust. Because disclaimers
ordinarily operate to divert bequests to other members of the debtor's immediate fam-
ily, this is a reasonable assumption. See supra note 37 and infra text accompanying notes
199-200. But in instances where this does not hold true, the option of disclaimer is
subject to an externality and debtors will prefer to take the lower, inefficient interest rate
(the externality arising from the fact that the alternative beneficiary is not a party to the
credit bargain).
142 It would appear that this analysis is equally pertinent to spendthrift trusts, and
that their validity can also be justified on this basis. Cf supra note 138.
143 This statement of the principle of the second best is actually a corollary of the
theorem as it is usually presented: If one corrects one imperfection in an imperfect
market, one does not necessarily move closer to Pareto-optimality. See generally Marko-
vitz, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World.- A
Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975
Wis. L. REV. 950. Though the principle of the second best may seem counter-intuitive,
it can be proven mathematically, and is applicable to all complex systems (as Arthur
Leff-of course-recognized, see Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nomi-
nalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 476 (1974)). For example, in the realm of neuro-pathology,
patients who suffer from the organic "imperfection" of epilepsy may be made "more
efficient" by adding the surgical "imperfection" of severance of the corpus callosum that
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Pareto-optimality cannot thereby be achieved, it can be more closely
approached. And because a right of disclaimer performs this func-
tion, it is a right that most parties should wish to include in the con-
tract for credit.
A recognition of the distortion caused by aggregated rates also
speaks to policies of wealth distribution. The wealth transfer from
poorer to richer debtors brought about by the right of disclaimer
actually represents a reduction in the subsidy from richer to poorer
debtors that already exists due to rate-setting. For present pur-
poses, however, such issues are beside the point, for fraud theory is
concerned with transactional efficiency, not distributive equity.144
It should be noted that a rule permitting insolvent disclaimer,
while desirable to most debtors and creditors, can still be contracted
around in individual instances. If, for whatever reason, 145 a debtor
and creditor prefer to bar insolvent disclaimer, they can do so sim-
ply by inserting a waiver of that right into the loan agreement. 146
This option ensures that debtors and creditors can always achieve
the most efficient solutionfor them.
2. Involuntary Creditors
When one turns from voluntary to involuntary extensions of
credit, the ethics and economics of the problem change dramati-
cally.147 The morality of the debtor-creditor relationship that we
dismissed in connection with commercial lending re-emerges when
connects their left and right hemispheres. See Gazzaniga, Review of the Split Brain, in THE
HUMAN BRAIN 89 (M. Wittrock ed. 1977). The principle of the second best is also under-
stood deeply, if unsystematically, by amateur golfers.
144 Since parties can contract around an inefficient fraudulent conveyance law, indi-
vidual contracts for credit will still reflect the more efficient rule, provided that the mar-
ginal benefits exceed transaction costs. Distributive equity, on the other hand, can be
imposed, inter alia, by resort to the tax system.
145 For example, where the information costs are negligible, or where a disclaimed
inheritance could not be captured and thus is of no value to the debtor. See supra note
141.
146 See Nielsen v. Cass County Social Servs. Bd., 395 N.W.2d 157, 160 (N.D. 1986)
(noting creditor's failure to obtain a waiver). Such waivers are enforceable under the
vast majority of disclaimer statutes. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801(d)(3) (1982).
Waivers should also be valid under traditional principles of contract law. Of course,
given the illusory character of an expectancy, creditors who wish to rely on the wealth of
a debtor's family would receive far better protection by obtaining a guarantee from the
testator or other relatives. Barring that possibility, a waiver by the debtor is the next
best option.
147 I have separated these two modes of analysis, in the Calabresian manner, for
distinct treatment. Professor Dworkin, by contrast, advocates an ideal "recipe" of the
two, which he calls "deep equality." This conflict of approach is, in more ways than one,
academic here, for I shall argue that in the instant case both morality and economics
point toward the same legal rule. Cf Calabresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ron-
ald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553 (1980); Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
563 (1980); see also R. POSNER, ECONOMiC ANALYSIS OF LAw 238-44 (3d ed. 1986). Of
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we consider persons who have become creditors against their
will. 14 8 Such creditors have not bargained with the debtor; they are
the victims of negligence or circumstance, who take the debtor as
they find him. Thus the theory that fraudulent conveyance law
serves simply to streamline the bargaining process breaks down in
this context. 149
Analyzed on a moral plane, the proscription of insolvent dis-
claimer against involuntary creditors can readily be justified. Hav-
ing incurred a debt without the consent of his creditor, the debtor
arguendo has an equitable obligation to restore the status quo ante with
every means at his disposal. 150 There is, if nothing else, poeticjus-
tice in a rule that applies the debtor's bonanza to mitigate his credi-
tor's catastrophe. On this basis one could also deduce a moral
obligation to accept inter vivos gifts, despite the differences re-
vealed by dominion theory. 151
Proceeding from ethical concerns to the dismal science, one can
also examine insolvent disclaimer against involuntary creditors from
the standpoint of economic efficiency. Here again, the analysis must
differ from that which applied to commercial lending. Bargaining
efficiency has naught to do with extensions of credit that were never
agreed to at all. In this context, fraudulent conveyance law should
function to allocate efficiently the costs of involuntary credit and to
modulate efficiently the debtor's propensity to acquire involuntary
debts.
Consider tort claims. The primary economic function of the
law of torts is to reduce the total cost of accidental injury by discour-
aging dangerous activities that may be beneficial to the tortfeasor,
course, strict utilitarians deny even the existence of a moral justice distinct from utility.
See, e.g., infra note 228.
148 The most obvious examples of involuntary creditors are tort victims, alimony
creditors, and child support creditors. Tax claimants might also be so classified. See
infra text accompanying note 169. For general discussions of the moral framework of
tort liability, see G. CALABRESI, supra note 140, at 291-308; Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in
Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
149 But see Baird & Jackson, supra note 127, at 835 n.20 (arguing that fraud theory
analysis should remain the same from the standpoint of both voluntary and involuntary
credit).
150 This equitable obligation appears strongest in the context of debtor-creditor re-
lationships created by the debtor's intentionally wrongful conduct (e.g., intentional tort
claims) and weakest where the relationship arose through no fault of the debtor (e.g., no-
fault support claims). Given the moral basis of the involuntary debtor-creditor relation-
ship, an involuntary creditor could conceivably seek recourse to an equitable construc-
tive trust over disclaimed assets, even without a statutory mandate. This potentially
promising avenue for relief has not been explored in the published cases. On the princi-
ples governing imposition of a constructive trust, see A. Scor-r, supra note 111, §§ 461-
64, at 2311-25.
151 See supra text accompanying notes I10-11. This analysis also pertains to dis-
claimers of non-probate assets. See supra note 32.
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but harmful to others.1 52 Were tortfeasors free from liability, and
thereby able to externalize the harm flowing from their actions, the
frequency of dangerous activity would rise to an economically ineffi-
cient level. Tort liability reduces such activity to an efficient level by
forcing tortfeasors to bear the cost of the injuries they cause.1 53
So far, so good. But tortfeasors may still be able to externalize
costs, despite the existence of liability rules, under certain condi-
tions. The most common such condition is liability insurance. The
more complete, or "perfect," one's insurance coverage, the greater
one's incentive to engage in the insured activity. This perverse in-
centive is known as the "moral hazard" of insurance.'5 4 Insurers
seek to alleviate moral hazard by building limits on coverage into
every insurance contract, such as the deductibility feature of auto-
mobile insurance.
Now consider the tortfeasor who is insolvent or who is ren-
dered so by his tortious conduct. Like the insured, the insolvent is
insulated from liability over and above the level of his assets. He
may therefore have an incentive to engage in dangerous activities.
There exists, in other words, a moral hazard of insolvency that
fraudulent conveyance law should strive to reduce for the sake of
social cost efficiency. A rule barring insolvent disclaimer against
tort-creditors serves this end. If potential tortfeasors know their ex-
pectancies are at risk, they will be that much less prone to engage in
tortious conduct.155
If one turns to the other principal varieties of involuntary
credit, namely alimony and child support, deterrence becomes irrel-
evant to the analysis: Courts do not award alimony and child sup-
port in order to reduce the incidence of divorce. Here, the only
relevant economic consideration is efficient distribution of the cost
of dissolution of the family.' 56 On the assumption that these costs
152 G. CALABRESI, supra note 140, at 26, 68-75; R. POSNER, supra note 147, at 186-87;
cf Veljanovski, The Economic Theory of Tort Liability-Toward a Corrective Justice Approach, in
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 126-27 (P. Burrows & C. Veljanovski eds. 1981); see
generally S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987).
153 In order for the level of dangerous activity thus achieved to be economically
efficient, the duty of care that established liability must itself be set at an efficient level,
i.e., where the marginal benefit of the care equals the marginal cost of accident avoid-
ance. R. POSNER, supra note 147, at 147-52, 160-65. It is sometimes (if dubiously) as-
sumed that the negligence standard is established at this level. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 29 (1972).
154 On the theory of moral hazard, see Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment,
58 Am. ECON. REv. 531 (1968).
155 This again assumes that, by disclaiming his inheritance, the debtor will be able to
enjoy its benefits. See supra note 37 and infra text accompanying notes 199-200. Were he
unable to do so, the debtor would have no incentive to disclaim, and a rule barring
disclaimer would have no effect on his conduct.
156 Efficient cost distribution is also a secondary consideration of tort law, see G.
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are more easily borne by the deeper pocket, 157 courts award ali-
mony and child support on the basis of need and ability to pay. 158
Having been ruled the better cost bearer, the alimony or child sup-
port debtor who receives an inheritance finds his pocket deepened
further. 159 Afortiori, he is better equipped to bear the cost of marital
dissolution after inheritance, which he could shift to the creditor if
disclaimer were permitted.160 Thus, from the standpoint of efficient
cost distribution, a rule barring disclaimer against alimony and child
support creditors appears appropriate. The same analysis pertains
to offers of inter vivos gifts. In each instance, morality and eco-
nomic efficiency point the law in the same direction.
In singling out involuntary creditors for special treatment
under the law, this critique stands in good company. Other com-
mentators have drawn the same conclusion in the course of studying
related problems. Professor Scott defended the legitimacy of
spendthrift trusts, but only so long as they remained ineffective
CALABRESI, supra note 140, at 26-28, which may conflict with the primary aim of cost
avoidance. Cf R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 78-79 (1986). Professor Clark argues that in
the analogous context of limited liability for corporate shareholders, a rule requiring
insurance (which accomplishes efficient cost spreading) could serve as an efficient substi-
tute for a rule permitting tort victims to pierce the corporate veil. Surely, Professor Clark
will agree that perfect insurance is undesirable because of the moral hazard that it poses.
See G. CALABRESI, supra note 140, at 43-44, 64-67. Therefore, the issue of the desirability
of limited liability-and, by analogy, of rules permitting insolvent disclaimer-will al-
ways lurk beyond the horizon of the protection that insurance provides.
157 This hypothesis, known to economists as the decreasing marginal utility of
wealth, is also reflected in other areas of the law, such as progressive taxation. One
should note that there have always been, and there remain today, wealthy persons who
disputed this hypothesis. Then, as now, their protests have met with skepticism, as when
an anonymous eighteenth-century Englishman marvelled that some of his countrymen
acted "as if our Possessions were become dearer in Proportion as they increased."
THOUGHTS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 40 (London 1770). For more recent literature on
the subject, see G. CALABRESI, supra note 140, at 39-41. The goal of efficient cost distri-
bution also encompasses avoidance of social cost. In this regard, alimony and child sup-
port creditors could become state charges, and public welfare is less cost efficient than
private support.
158 See, e.g., H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC: RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
182-87, 442-47, 488-98 (1968). In Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional a statute that limited alimony awards to wives. It is sometimes
suggested that the "deep pocket" method of cost distribution is also reflected, sotto voce,
injury awards in tort cases. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 140, at 283 n.9. To the extent
that this is true, the analysis of alimony and child support debtors is also pertinent to
disclaimer rules governing tort debtors.
159 Once again, we assume that the disclaimant is able in practice to enjoy the dis-
claimed property. Were this not so, one would have to compare the depth of the ali-
mony or child support creditor's pocket with that of the alternative beneficiary, and no
uniform answer would result.
160 Though it might appear that an insolvent disclaimant is ipsofacto a shallow pocket,
the creditor may also be in dire straits. At any rate, a divorce or support decree is sub-
ject to modification upon changed circumstances, so the relative depths of the parties'
pockets can be re-measured at the time of the inheritance. See H. CLARK, JR., supra note
158, at 443-44 & nn.29-30.
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against involuntary creditors. Scott thought it would be "shocking
indeed" to permit the debtor to continue to enjoy a spendthrift trust
while a creditor "who . . . has no opportunity to investigate the
[debtor's] credit" remained unpaid.' 61 Scott's caveat has become
law, in whole or in part, in many states. 162 Similarly, scholars have
argued that involuntary creditors of undercapitalized corporate
debtors should be permitted to pierce the corporate veil to reach
the assets of shareholders. Such creditors likewise never agreed to
rely on shareholders' limited liability. 163 This too has been the
trend of the law, de facto if not de jure. 164 The point has also been
debated in connection with exemption policy and the discharge in
bankruptcy, although the trend of the law in these areas is less
clear. 165
Nonetheless, there remain some difficulties with a bifurcated
approach to insolvent disclaimer. Such an approach would carry in
its train the additional (if marginal) administrative cost of judicially
161 A. SCOTT, supra note 11I, §§ 157, 157.1, 157.5, at 788-800. Professor Griswold
made the same point. See E. GRISWOLD, supra note 129, at 396-400, 442-44. See also
Note, Tort Liability of the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift Trust, 57 DICK. L. REV. 220, 221 (1953);
Note, Spendthrift Trusts: Attachability of a Beneficiary's Interest in Satisfaction of a Tort Claim, 28
NOTRE DAME LAW. 509, 515 (1953); Note, Trusts: Tort Claims as an Exception to the Spend-
thrift Trust Doctrine, 17 OKLA. L. REV. 235, 237 (1964); Note, Trusts: Limitations on the
Immunities of Spendthrift Trusts: Support and Alimony Claims, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 615 (1956).
162 The caveat is incorporated into Professor Griswold's model spendthrift trust act,
E. GRISWOLD, supra note 129, § 2(c), at 648. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 157 & comment (1959). On the present state of the law, see 5 W. PAGE, supra note 6,
§ 44.31, at 484-85 nn.32-35; Bushman, supra note 138, at 308-09; Annotation, 91
A.L.R.2d 262 (1963); A. SCOTT, supra note 11, §§ 157.1, 157.5 & n.1, at 789-800.
163 See, e.g., Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEx. L. REV. 979, 984-85 (1971). See
also Siliciano, Corporate Behavior and the Social Efficiency of Tort Law, 85 MICmH. L. REV. 1820,
1857-59 (1987).
164 Frey, Legal Analysis and the "De Facto" Doctrine, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1153, 1176
(1952); Hackney &-Denson, Shareholder Liuiltyfor aequate Capitai, 403 U. Prrr. L. Ray.
837, 867-69 (1982). Courts have not, however, been willing to pierce the corporate veil
in tort cases where the sole justification for doing so is involuntary insolvency.
165 Cf Vukowich, The Bankruptcy Commission's Proposal Regarding Bankrupts' Exemption
Rights, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1474-77 (1975); T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW 266, 278-79 (1986); Hallinan, supra note 136, at 131-32; R. CLARK,
supra note 156, at 78-81. Under state exemption laws, involuntary creditors can some-
times reach exempt property, see T. JACKSON, supra, at 266 n.30, and some involuntary
creditor claims pass through bankruptcy as well: tax claims, alimony and child support
claims, and willful injury (but not negligence) claims are all excepted from discharge. 11
U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(1), (5), & (6) (West Supp. 1988). Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
unliquidated tort claims were also non-dischargeable, and the distinction was justified
on both moral and economic grounds; the new Bankruptcy Code eliminates this excep-
tion from discharge. Hallinan, supra note 136, at 60-65, 87-88 & n.164. Curiously,
scholars have never proposed such a bifurcated analysis for unexercised general powers
of appointment, an area to which it could be logically applied. Arguendo, involuntary
creditors have a stronger claim to the corpus of an unexercised general power than do
ordinary contract creditors. Such a special claim has never been advocated or enacted in
any state, although some states now permit all creditors to reach unexercised general
powers. See supra note 113.
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evaluating the standing of petitioning creditors to set a disclaimer
aside.1 66 In the process of differentiating voluntary from involun-
tary creditors, lawmakers would also have to wrestle with some hard
cases: There is a grey area in between. Take, for instance, emer-
gency services creditors and essential support creditors. While
credit for emergency medical attention and institutional care is,
strictly speaking, extended voluntarily, there may nonetheless be an
element of duress involved. Should such creditors have the right to
prevent a disclaimer? On the one hand, these are commercial credi-
tors who, like any other contract creditor, can make a profit despite
incidental default by factoring the risk into the price of their serv-
ices. On the other hand, like torts, the services provided by these
commercial creditors involve social costs. When an emergency serv-
ices creditor denies treatment to a patient with a high risk of default,
it can externalize the social cost of such behavior. Thus, a rule bar-
ring disclaimer against such creditors might help to promote so-
cially beneficial conduct.167 The question, it seems, can be argued
both ways. 168
Tax and other welfare service creditors present similar concep-
tual difficulties. While these can be conceived at one level as invol-
untary creditors, at another level they are not. We do, after all, live
in a democracy, where taxes and welfare are the products of legisla-
tive action. Tax and welfare agencies are really (social) contract
creditors, and the opportunity for disclaimer depends upon the
terms of the (political) bargain. On the one hand, it would be rela-
tively simple to factor the risk of disclaimer into the "cost" of taxa-
tion or welfare. With a universal pool of taxpayers to draw upon,
government is the ideal risk spreader. On the other hand, as a mat-
ter of social policy, it might well be deemed inequitable to relieve a
disclaimant of his share of the tax burden or to permit him to re-
ceive welfare benefits. 169 Once again, the argument has two sides.
166 Under the approach suggested here, involuntary creditors could bar disclaimer
up to the amount necessary to satisfy their claims in toto, whether the debt was in the
form of a set liability award or, as in the case of alimony, a prospective stream of pay-
ments whose present value could be actuarially estimated. The result may be that the
debtor would still have the right to disclaim part of his inheritance, but partial disclaimer
is already permissible in virtually every state. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801(a)
(1982). Those assets that the beneficiary non-disclaimed by court order should also be
subject to a statutory lien in favor of the petitioning involuntary creditors, in order to
prevent contract creditors from free-riding on involuntary creditors' rights.
167 Extension of these services may be conceptualized as "inverse torts" for pur-
poses of social cost avoidance analysis.
168 By analogy, emergency service and support creditors are empowered to reach
spendthrift trusts in some jurisdictions. A. ScoTT, supra note 111, § 157.2, at 794-96;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157(b) & comment (b) (1957).
169 This appears to have been the substantive basis for the court's decision in
Scrivani. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80; see also Nielsen v. Cass County Social
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In sum, a rule bifurcating the treatment of insolvent disclaimer
would require thoughtful refinement. But in that, of course, the
doctrine of disclaimer would hardly differ from the balance of the
probate code. Penumbrae such as those identified here surround
many, perhaps every, principle of law. Uncertainty in the applica-
tion of a selective bar on insolvent disclaimer could be minimized by
way of precise legislative definition of the creditors who qualified.
As of yet, however, no state has undertaken to develop such a rule,
with one limited exception: New York's special remedy for Medi-
caid creditors.170
3. Exceptions
However one resolves these issues, there remains the matter of
exceptions. As previously noted, cases that permit insolvent dis-
claimer frequently require that it be unaccompanied by collusion or
creditor reliance.' 7 1 Should laws governing the insolvent benefici-
ary's right to disclaim be per se rules? Or should those rules be qual-
ified? And, if so, how?
We have already considered generally the problem of reliance.
Simply put, if a voluntary creditor wishes to rely on his debtor's
prospects of inheritance, efficiency dictates that he be required to
affirm that reliance, by soliciting from the debtor a waiver of his
right to disclaim. 172 Given the enforceability of such waivers, no
further exception for creditors' reliance on their debtors' expectan-
cies is necessary. Occasionally, however, creditors may rely not on
their debtors' prospects of inheriting property, but rather on their os-
Servs. Bd., 395 N.W.2d 157, 161 (N.D. 1986) (dissent). By analogy, tax creditors and
welfare creditors have been able to reach spendthrift trusts in some jurisdictions. W.
PAGE, supra note 6, § 44.31 at 485 nn.34-35; A. ScoTT, supra note 111, § 157.4, at 797-
99; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 157(d) & comment (d) (1957).
170 In re Scrivani, 116 Misc. 2d 204, 455 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup. Ct. 1982), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 77-87. It should be pointed out, however, that as a tech-
nical matter the court in Scrivani declined to bifurcate the law of insolvent disclaimer,
creating instead the special remedy of permitting the creditor to terminate its assistance
to the disclaimant. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. See also infra note 269
(extending this remedy to a related problem). Contra the result in Scrivani, see Nielsen v.
Cass County Social Servs. Bd., 395 N.W.2d at 157.
171 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. In defense of these traditional ex-
ceptions, see Note, Renunciation, supra note 90, at 157-59.
172 The ease with which a creditor can demand a waiver, coupled with the fact that
creditors will not ordinarily rely on expectancies, see supra text accompanying notes 129-
35, dictate this result. See In re Seal, 261 F. 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1919), where a debtor alleg-
edly borrowed money upon the representation of his ability to repay out of a forthcom-
ing inheritance and then declared bankruptcy before the testator's death. Held, not a
fraud on the bankruptcy court because, inter alia, the testator "could at any time have
changed her will." Id. at 112. Whether such an informal representation could fall under
the "reliance" exception is unclear. See supra note 37.
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tensible present rights to such property. In Daniel v. Frost,1 73 a credi-
tor extended credit to the debtor while he was in possession of land
that actually belonged to his father-in-law. The debtor subsequently
inherited this property, but sought to disclaim it in order to defeat
his creditor. The court held the disclaimer ineffective: The debtor's
possession of the property as ostensible owner was an "equitable
fact," sufficient in the eyes of the court to bar disclaimer once the
debtor actually inherited the property. 74
The holding in Frost seems questionable on policy grounds.
The elaborate systems for recording title to real property, found in
every state, operate to avoid precisely the sort of ostensible owner-
ship problem that arose in that case. Creditors should be aware that
not all persons own the real property they possess. If a creditor
neglects to check the title record, he has only himself to blame.
When a creditor relies on his debtors' misrepresentation of ownership,
however, the argument for barring subsequent disclaimer grows
stronger. It would seem economically efficient to permit a creditor
to rely on his debtors' averments, provided that the rights of third
parties are not at issue.' 75
The presence of collusion raises other concerns. Though
courts have not spelled out precisely what constitutes collusion, 176
the caveat presumably covers arrangements that permit the disclai-
mant to retain beneficial enjoyment of the disclaimed property (say,
by living in a disclaimed residence rent free), as well as agreements
to pass the property on to the disclaimant's favored recipients.
From the standpoint of dominion theory, there is a clear distinction
between these scenarios and a quasi-conveyance. Via a collusive ar-
rangement, the disclaimant exercises effective control over the dis-
claimed property, either capturing its benefits or channeling them
to chosen others. This produces a substantively different outcome
from a non-collusive disclaimer, where the decedent's intent re-
mains operative. Dominion theory thus offers a possible rationale
for the caveat against collusion.' 77
173 62 Ga. 697 (1897).
174 Id. at 708-09.
175 By contrast, a debtor's misrepresentation that his property is not mortgaged will
not give a creditor a claim equal to that of the third party mortgagee (so long as the
mortgage has been recorded). In Frost, third party claims were not involved. In the case
of personal property for which no title record exists, the efficiency of a right of reliance
upon representations of ownership is even greater.
176 See supra note 37.
177 See supra text accompanying notes 116-18. Were we thus to implement dominion
theory, it might well be reasonable to go a step further and rebuttably presume the
presence of collusion, given that it is probably common, but remains difficult to prove.
See supra note 37. Alternatively, the burden of proof could shift in the event of an "un-
natural" disclaimer, e.g., one that leaves the bequest in the hands of ascendants or collat-
[Vol. 74:587624
THE INSOLVENT HEIR
As a matter of fraud theory, however, there seems to be no jus-
tification for this caveat. When an insolvent devisee chooses non-
collusively to disclaim his inheritance, an alternative beneficiary re-
ceives the property instead of the creditor. Were we to view the
transfer as a fraudulent conveyance, we would say that the disclai-
mant here is being "generous before he is just," otherwise known as
"constructive fraud." 178 When a disclaimant retains control over
the disclaimed property through willful collusion, however, he is
guilty of "actual fraud." Now, when a court bars only collusive dis-
claimers it is, in effect, proscribing only one form of fraud in con-
nection with inherited assets. Yet, the law of fraudulent
conveyances has traditionally recognized no qualitative distinction
between the two. 179
Historically, courts conceived of constructive fraud as conduct
from which fraudulent intent could be inferred, thereby equating it
with actual fraud.' 80 The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act
abandons the inferred intent theory and instead views constructive
fraud as conduct from which fraudulent intent should be presumed
because the conduct "wrong[s] creditors," even "where an intent to
defraud... does not in fact exist." 18' Nonetheless, the Uniform Act
maintains the equation of the two strains of fraud by also justifying
actual fraud on the basis of harm done to creditors.18 2 The point is
that voluntary creditors sustain no harm if collusion is present, for
they have not bargained for the right to reach disclaimed assets in
erals rather than descendants. On the general principles governing allocation of burden
of proof, see C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 785-89, esp. 787 (2d
ed. 1972).
178 Neeld's Estate, 38 Pa. D. & C. 381, 386-87, 389 (Phila. County Ct. 1940) (equat-
ing insolvent disclaimer with an Article 4 (constructive fraud) violation of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act); cf. In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 810, 108 P.2d 401,
402-03 (1940) (fraudulent intent admitted by debtor); Stein v. Brown, 18 Ohio St. 3d
305, 308 & n.1, 480 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 & n.l (1985) (proceeding on a fraudulent intent
theory absent evidence of insolvency, but noting that a constructive fraud theory would
otherwise apply); Estate of Reed, 566 P.2d 587, 588-90, 592-93 (Wyo. 1977) (proceed-
ing on a fraudulent intent theory with an incomplete trial record; dissent objects to pro-
cess but notes potential applicability of constructive fraud theory).
179 U.F.C.A. §§ 4,7, 7A U.L.A. 474, 509 (1918). One exception, found in some
states, is the denial of reimbursement to third parties who maintain property conveyed
to them when they participate in actual, and not merely constructive, fraud. This dis-
tinctive treatment is criticized by Professor Glenn. See I G. GLENN, supra note 5, § § 250-
55, at 431-36.
180 This reasoning underlies all of the early cases, beginning with dicta in Twyne's
Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601), which held conveyances for inadequate consideration
fraudulent, despite the requirement of actual fraud under the statute of 13 Eliz. ch. 5
(1570).
181 U.F.C.A. Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 427-29 (1918).
182 Id. For a discussion of the theory of constructive fraud, see McCoid, Constructively
Fraudulent Conveyances: Transfers for Inadequate Consideration, 62 TEx. L. REV. 639 (1983).
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any event. 183 Though dominion theory suggests distinctions be-
tween the two situations, they are distinctions without a difference
from the standpoint of fraud theory.
We may, indeed, carry this logic one step further: Once we
have concluded that the law ought to permit insolvent disclaimer in
certain cases, there is no reason in fraud theory to deny debtors the
right simply to accept the gratuitous transfer outright in those same
cases, exempt from creditor levy. After all, if contract creditors have
not set their interest rates in reliance upon inheritance, why should
insolvent debtors have to quasi-convey (or collusively convey) the
property away? Creditors have no cause for complaint, even if the
inheritance remains overtly in the debtor's hands. While it might
appear "unseemly" to permit a debtor to benefit from an inheri-
tance while his debts go unpaid, this image dissolves once we dis-
cern the commercial nature of the bargain. 184
At the same time, a rule that exempts inheritances from levy
could entail administrative costs. Under the approach suggested
here, inherited assets would be exempt from levy only by pre-inheri-
tance (i.e., non-relying) contract creditors. Courts would have to es-
tablish the status of each creditor who sought a writ of execution.
What is more, an exemption for inherited assets could pose formi-
dable tracing problems. Debtors would have to segregate such as-
sets to ensure that their origin could be identified. But assuming
that these practical difficulties could be surmounted,'8 5 the lessons
of fraud theory need not be limited to the law of disclaimer alone.
C. Inheritance Theory and the Problem of Intent
When one examines the problem of the insolvent heir from the
perspective of gratuitous transfers law, the focus of the analysis
shifts a bit. Here, the spotlight is trained on the nexus between ben-
eficiary and benefactor, instead of the nexus between beneficiary
and his creditor. Modem courts conceive of inheritance as the
product of a voluntary relation: The gratuitous transfer is not a uni-
lateral action, but a bilateral transaction. As under contract law, there
183 See supra text accompanying notes 129-35.
184 See supra text accompanying notes 124-25. Once again, the analogy to the policy
debate over spendthrift trusts is obvious.
185 Even if these administrative difficulties were compelling, insolvent debtors could
still be permitted to assign the inheritance to whomever they chose, even though under
dominion theory this act would be deemed a "conveyance." Fraud theory suggests no
reason to treat assignments differently from disclaimers, and in this context no creditor-
identification or tracing problems could arise. Traditionally, however, the law has dis-




must be a "meeting of the minds."18 6 Thus, in judging the nature
and execution of a gratuitous transfer, courts place paramount em-
phasis on the intentions of parties.
1. Beneficiary
Given this legal foundation, one commentator has asserted
that, whatever the result dictated by fraud theory, courts cannot
tamper with the beneficiary's "absolute right" to refuse an offer. 187
Absolute rights, however, are not the stuff of law. Neither history188
nor current theory supports the notion that citizens must enjoy
complete transactional liberty. Take the law of contract. Just as one
may be denied the right to contract when one wishes to,' 8 9 one may
be effectively obligated, under certain circumstances, to contract
when one would prefer not to. Quasi-contract and promissory es-
toppel are examples of doctrines under which a party, due to his
own conduct, is in effect obliged to contract against his will. 190 By
analogy, obligating a beneficiary to accept the offer of a gratuity due
to his own conduct of having incurred debts beyond his ability to
satisfy creditors would not contravene hallowed principles of trans-
actional autonomy.
Transactional liberty, then, is not boundless; but neither is it a
nonsense. The mirror image of the argument that debtors have an
absolute right to transactional autonomy is the proposition that law-
makers can and should establish rules barring insolvent disclaimer
in the debtor's own interest. As one commentator argues, "In the
long run, the debtor's economic interests are subserved, though his
186 Welch v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 243, 255 (1860); 6W. PAGE, supra note 6, § 49.4, at 41-
42; Note and Commentary, 25 MICH. L. REv. 171 (1926). But see 4 H. TIFFANY, supra
note 92, §§ 1055-58; Tiffany, Delivery and Acceptance of Deeds, 17 MICH. L. REV. 103, 120-
26 (1918).
187 Note, Renunciation, supra note 90, at 159. Defenders of creditors' rights have
tended to disavow the transactional conception of gratuitous transfers in favor of Profes-
sor Tiffany's view of them as actions by the benefactor, see supra note 186, making the
beneficiary's intent irrelevant. See, e.g., Note, Renunciation of a Devise, supra note 37, at
943, 945-47; Recent Case, 12 Mo. L. REV. 69 (1947). In light of the statutory abolition
of the feudal treatment of heirship, see supra note 49 and accompanying text, this theoret-
ical view lacks modem judicial support.
188 See, e.g., M. HoRwrrZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
160-73 (1977).
189 The power to accept a contract is denied where the contract offer violates public
policy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 36, comment (c).
190 See, e.g., Williston:
Quasi contractual obligations are imposed by the law for the purpose of
bringing about justice without reference to the intention of the parties.
The only apparent restriction upon the power of the law to create such
obligations is that they must be of such a sort as would have been appro-
priately enforced under common-law procedure by a contractual action.
I S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 3A, at 13 (3d ed. 1957).
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individual pride may not be, by allowing the creditors to satisfy their
claims out of this property, thus saving the shortsighted debtor any
further harassing by these particular satisfied creditors."'19 This pa-
ternalistic rationale has found its way into the reasoning of at least
one case.' 92 Assuming for the moment that such paternalism were
warranted, the logic of its application to bar insolvent disclaim is
questionable. The debtor might wish to disclaim property in antici-
pation of a workout or a bankruptcy proceeding, in which event
state and federal law would protect him from further harassment. 193
Thus, disclaimer might well be in the debtor's interest. But the as-
sumption that lawmakers should consider such issues when setting
rules of disclaimer is itself contrary to established principles ofjus-
tice. Though the law denies complete transactional freedom, it has
yet to impose transactional slavery. Lawmakers of our era have in-
truded on the self-determination of transacting parties only when
justified by extraordinary circumstances, 194 and here the utility of
the intrusion is not even clear.
In order to determine whether an abridgement of the benefici-
ary's transactional autonomy is justifiable as a matter of
(nonpaternal) policy, one must weigh the harm he will suffer by such
an abridgement against the harm unabridged autonomy would do to
his creditors. In denying insolvents the right to disclaim, the
Supreme Court of California baldly declared that a beneficiary can
"without hardship .. .avail himself of a bequest."' 195 Against the
perceived equities in favor of protecting creditors' rights, the court
could find no countervailing equities in favor of defending the bene-
ficiary's freedom to refuse an offer. Yet this conclusion is not so
manifest that it can be accepted without analysis.
One can hypothesize a variety of reasons why beneficiaries
might prefer to decline a gratuitous transfer, apart from a desire to
avoid paying their creditors. The right of disclaimer originally de-
191 Comment, supra note 88, at 302 n.20.
192 See In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 813, 108 P.2d 401, 404 (1940).
193 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 362(a)(6), 524(a)(2) (West 1988). Following a workout (which
legally terminates the debtor-creditor relationship), harassment would be actionable in
tort as a violation of privacy. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
802-18 (1971). Once again, we assume that the debtor can in practice enjoy the dis-
claimed property. See supra note 37 and infra text accompanying notes 199-200. Thus,
something more than "individual pride" is at stake.
194 For example, social welfare contracts are imposed upon workers because they
tend to discount their long-term future interest. See Diamond, A Framework for Social
Security Analysis, 8 J. PUB. ECON. 275 (1977). No similar human failing is apparent to
justify paternalism in the instant situation, and none are cited in the sources urging this
approach. See supra notes 191-92. See generally Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Con-
tracts, 92 YALE LJ. 763 (1983).
195 In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d at 813, 108 P.2d at 404; cf In re Scrivani, 116 Misc.
2d 204, 208, 455 N.Y.S.2d 505, 509 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
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veloped to permit beneficiaries to deflect forceable transfers of
worthless property, such as property held subject to a trust.1 96 Yet,
some beneficiaries might find even property of objective value to be
subjectively undesirable.1 97 As one early American court noted,
"Riches are not to be forced on people.... Property is a burden as
well as a benefit, and whoever is unwilling to bear the burden for the
sake of the benefit, is at liberty to decline both."'198 But this ration-
ale for disclaimer is inadequate to counter a creditor's claim. Credi-
tors will gladly unburden the beneficiary of the gratuity directly; he
need not suffer the imposition any longer than the time needed to
deliver the property to his creditors' doorsteps.
The most common modern inducement for disclaimer is family
wealth planning. By declining to accept a bequest, the disclaimant,
in effect, exercises his own donative intent. In the process, he may
succeed in skipping a generation's worth of inheritance taxes.1 99
This motive could exist whether or not the disclaimant was himself
financially embarrassed. Under classical principles of fraud theory,
however, the desire for effective family wealth planning fails to out-
weigh creditors' claims. It has long been firmly settled that, once
insolvent, a debtor loses his right to pursue his donative inclina-
tions.200 While not necessarily painless, this loss of right causes no
net hardship to the disclaimant, for it leaves him no worse off than if
he had never received the bequest in the first place.
Alternatively, a beneficiary may wish to relinquish a gratuitous
transfer simply in order to assert his self-reliance. 20' Yet here again,
196 See supra note 22.
197 New England transcendentalists such as Henry David Thoreau eschewed the
world of material goods. See H. THOREAU, WALDEN, OR LIFE IN THE WOODS 37 (1929)
(1st ed. 1854) ("And when the farmer has got his house, he may not be the richer but
the poorer for it, and it be the house that has got him."). This view is also taken by a
number of current religious and philosophical movements, such as the Amish sect. See
E. SCHWIEDER & D. SCHWIEDER, A PECULIAR PEOPLE: IOWA'S OLD ORDER AMISH 51-53
(1975); see alsoJ. STEINBECK, TORTILLA FLAT 17, 28-29, 260-61 (1935); A. CARNEGIE, THE
GOSPEL OF WEALTH 20-21, 25 (E. Kirkland ed. 1962) ("I would as soon leave to my son a
curse as the almighty dollar.").
198 Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697, 706 (1879).
199 Since he knows the identity of the alternative beneficiary, the primary beneficiary
can decide whether that person is someone he wishes to benefit ahead of himself. On
the family wealth planning implications of disclaimers, see generally Note, Disclaimer, supra
note 90; Martin, supra note 34.
200 U.F.C.A. § 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1918). Whence the maxim that the debtor must be
"just before he is generous," even absent fraudulent intent. The wish to avoid gratui-
tous transfer taxes is of course subordinate to the disclaimant's desire to benefit others,
for the tax never exceeds the gratuity. This aim merely fortifies the disclaimant's dona-
tive intent and will never exist in isolation. Cf In re Scrivani, 116 Misc. 2d 204, 208, 455
N.Y.S.2d 504, 509 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
201 This position was advocated by Ralph Waldo Emerson, another transcendental-
ist. See 3 R. EMERSON, Gifts, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 93-96
(J. Slater ed. 1983).
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this rather esoteric desire seems of little weight against creditors'
claims. Arguably, a beneficiary who has fallen into debt has already,
in a sense, abandoned his self-reliance. But even assuming that he
still has a legitimate claim to this privilege, a beneficiary who is
forced to accept a gratuity can maintain his self-reliance simply by
undertaking to repay his benefactor (or his estate). The gratuitous
transfer thereby becomes a wash from the beneficiary's point of
view; his net position remains effectively unchanged.
The most persuasive argument for granting beneficiaries an un-
qualified right of refusal is that acceptance of a gratuity may entail
onerous moral obligations. The fact, if not the law, of the matter is
that few transfers are gratuitous in a literal sense. They are, in the
main, exchanges for value of various sorts not formally recognized
by the legal system,202 but which nonetheless remain enforceable via
extra-legal means of social control. This reality has long been ac-
knowledged in the sociological203 and economic20 4 literature.
When viewed in a practical light, the distinction between a contract
and a gratuitous transfer is thus blurrier than it appears at first
glance.20 5
Now, if we acknowledge that gratuitous transfers may come
with strings attached, often of a deeply personal nature, it becomes
a serious question whether even involuntary creditors ought to have
authority to compel acceptance. By tradition, our legal system has
refused to coerce citizens to undertake laborious or intimate activi-
ties against their will. The degradation and intrusiveness inherent
in such coercion is of sufficient gravity to have occasioned constitu-
202 The concept of moral obligation is nonetheless not alien to the common law. See
IA A. CORBIN, ON CONTRACTS §§ 230-32, at 340-52 (1963); 1 G. GLENN, supra note 5,
§§ 264-64a, at 451-52.
203 The classic studies of the social psychology and cultural anthropology of gratui-
tous transfers are C. LEVI-STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP 52-68
(rev. ed. 1969); M. MAuSS, THE GIFT (1954); G. SIMMEL, Faithfulness and Gratitude, in THE
SOCIOLOGY OF GEORGE SIMMEL 379-95 (K. Wolff ed. 1950); Schwartz, The Social Psychol-
ogy of the Gifi, 73 AM.J. SOCIOLOGY 1 (1967).
204 Economic writing (rooted, as always, in utilitarian philosophy) also has empha-
sized interdependent utility functions to explain gratuity. See K. BOULDING, THE ECON-
OMY OF LOVE AND FEAR 1-34 (1973); Becker, A Theory of Social Interaction, 82J. POL. ECON.
1063 (1974) (reprinted in G. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR
ch. 12 (1976)); Bernheim, Schleifer & Summers, The Strategic Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL.
ECON. 1045 (1985); Cox, Motives for Private Income Transfers, 95J. POL. ECON. 508 (1987);
see also Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 411 (1977) (on
promises to make gifts. For a good summary, see D. FRIEDMAN, The Economics ofAltruism, in
PRICE THEORY 489-96 (1986).
205 Claude Levi-Strauss and Marcel Mauss both assert that what developed into con-
tractual exchange began in primitive societies as reciprocal gifts. See supra note 203. See
also Miller, Gift, Sale, Payment, Raid: Case Studies in the Negotiation and Classification of Ex-
change in Medieval Iceland, 61 SPECULUM 18 (1986).
630 [Vol. 74:587
THE INSOLVENT HEIR
tional proscriptions. 20 6 Presumably, a statute compelling insolvents
to accept and perform a conditional bequest would be constitution-
ally suspect, at least insofar as the statute pertained to non-nominal
conditions. 20 7 Yet, a law compelling acceptance of unconditional
gratuities which contain implicit conditions should raise similar con-
cerns. To give an acute example, offers of gratuities that are accom-
panied by sexual advances may well be tantamount to conditional
offers from the offerees' point of view. While the absence of a legal
condition probably suffices to remove constitutional impediments to
obligatory acceptance in such cases, the possibility of a moral quid
pro quo ought not to be ignored when we establish disclaimer
policy.
Such considerations, in turn, may lead us to draw a distinction
between disclaimers of inter vivos and testamentary transfers that
failed to emerge out of fraud theory. Inter vivos gifts are far more
likely to carry future moral obligations than are bequests, which,
under the circumstances, more commonly serve to reward the bene-
ficiary for moral considerations past.20 8 Furthermore, the coercive
pressures to fulfill moral obligations are likely to be stronger when
the obligor is alive and able to monitor the obligee. Such pressures
diminish when the obligor is dead (and presumably unable to exert
further influence). Given the heightened threat of moral obligations
in the inter vivos setting, an unqualified right to refuse offers of gifts
may well be warranted, even against involuntary creditors. But ab-
sent such a threat in the testamentary setting, an equivalent right to
disclaim a bequest 20 9 is more difficult to justify on the ground of
personal autonomy. 210
206 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; I G. GLENN, supra note 5, § 140, at 259-61; Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITTIONAL LAw ch. 15 (1978)
(discussing the constitutional right to privacy); Regen, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L.
REv. 1569, 1569-71, 1583-88, 1618-30 (1979) (discussing constitutional protection from
coercive personal impositions).
207 Those statutes that proscribe insolvent disclaimer do not address the issue of
conditional bequests. See supra note 53. See also Estate ofJensen, 26 Cal. App. 3d 474,
102 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1972) (requiring insolvent devisee to fulfill a condition to pay a
"nominal" sum into the estate to receive his devise).
208 Cf Schwartz, supra note 203, at 9 ("It must be noted that gratitude binds not only
the living, but connects the living and the dead as well.... Inherited benefits, insofar as
they cannot be reciprocated, generate eternal indebtedness and thereby link together
present and past."). The wish to avoid "eternal indebtedness," as opposed to obliga-
tion, would in effect translate into a desire to assert one's self-reliance. See supra text
accompanying note 201.
209 In the present context, testamentary substitutes (i.e., non-probate assets) should
be classed with bequests, because they play the same social function. Thus, revocable
inter vivos trusts and gifts causa mortis should for purposes of establishing disclaimability,
but not necessarily for other purposes, be deemed testamentary. See generally Langbein,
supra note 32, at 1125-41 (proposing conceptual reform in this area).




Along with the intent of the beneficiary, one has also to con-
sider the intent of the benefactor. Several opinions defend the right
of insolvent disclaimer on the ground that to compel acceptance
would violate the "probable intent" of the testator, who "sought to
benefit the distributee and not a public or private creditor." 21' In
order to carry out the benefactor's probable intent, the beneficiary's
right of disclaimer must be assured.2 12
This speculation seems intuitively logical. A beneficiary who
anticipates bankruptcy or a workout may be able to improve his po-
sition by disclaiming (and thereby preserving for his relatives or for
surreptitious personal enjoyment) property that would otherwise go
to satisfy debts that will be discharged or forgiven anyway. Benefac-
tors should ordinarily prefer to leave their beneficiaries the option
of sheltering their inheritances in such circumstances. Conceivably,
some patriarchs might see the matter differently. They might specif-
ically intend that their legacies be used to stave off bankruptcy,
whether to avoid the resulting family stigma or simply out of "old-
time conscientiousness. ' 21 3 Granting, however, that most benefac-
tors would take a more pragmatic view and would give insolvent
beneficiaries the right to disclaim if they could, we must again weigh
the public policies in favor of effectuating that intent against the
public policies that support satisfaction of (involuntary) creditors'
claims out of inherited assets.
In balancing out these concerns, one should note at the outset
that courts traditionally exalt freedom of testation and the fulfill-
ment of testamentary intent as central to gratuitous transfers policy.
"As often, and not too often, said, the testamentary right is one of
the most important of the inherent incidents of human exist-
ence, ' 214 one court has stated; therefore, "[i]n the construction of
devises, the intention of the testator is admitted to be the pole star
or rebuttable presumptions. Should the beneficiary of an inheritance have the right to
prove that acceptance will entail future moral obligations that he finds objectionable?
Should precatory instructions accompanying a bequest suffice to shift the presumption?
Needless to say, the evidence in such a case would be highly subjective, though perhaps
not hopelessly elusive.
211 Estate of Oot, 95 Misc. 2d 702, 705-06, 408 N.Y.S.2d 303, 306 (Surr. Ct. 1978);
In re Scrivani, 116 Misc. 2d 204, 209, 455 N.Y.S.2d 505, 509 (Sup. Ct. 1982); see Ohio
National Bank of Columbus v. Miller, 41 Ohio App. 250, 255, 57 N.E.2d 717, 719-20
(1943) (express provision for a right of disclaimer deemed dispositive).
212 This argument, which has appeared in several commentaries, influenced the
drafters of the Uniform Probate Code. See Fratcher, supra note 90, at 1077; Note, Renun-
ciation, supra note 90, at 160-61, 165.
213 Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697, 705-06 (1879) (inferring testator's intent that credi-
tors' claims be satisfied).
214 Ball v. Boston, 153 Wis. 27, 31-32, 141 N.W. 8, 10 (1913).
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by which the courts must steer.'"215 Nonetheless, as with every legal
principle, the principle of intent effectuation has its limits. It does
not automatically trump all other policy considerations. 21 6 Were
courts to shape the law of insolvent disclaimer by reference to the
testator's probable intent, they would in fact be carrying intent ef-
fectuation beyond its historical bounds.
The traditional limits of intent effectuation may be illustrated
with a simple example: A debtor waives his right to disclaim all gra-
tuitous transfers; he is now contractually bound not to do so. The
debtor subsequently inherits under a will which purports expressly
to restore his right of disclaimer. Will a court give effect to the tes-
tator's intent? Surely it will not.217 Lawmakers have decided, as a
matter of policy, to permit persons to place restrictions on their own
conduct by contract. In enforcing the law of contractual obligation,
courts do not take into consideration the wishes of third parties.
This same principle applies to the law of fraudulent conveyances (as
it pertains to disclaimers): Lawmakers impose these restrictions on
conduct on the basis of policies governing the relation of debtors
and creditors, not on the basis of what third parties expressly (let
alone probably) would prefer fraudulent conveyance law to look
like. Allowing the wishes of third parties to alter the terms of the
debtor-creditor relationship would render the rights of creditors
precarious and frustrate other policy goals of debtor-creditor law.218
215 4J. KENT, supra note 26, at *537. The phrase has been often repeated. E.g.,
Biles v. Martin, 288 Ala. 231, 236, 259 So.2d 258, 262 (1972). There is, however, no
constitutional right to freedom of testation. See infra note 229.
216 "The privilege of disposing of property is not absolute; it is hedged with various
restrictions where there are policy considerations warranting the limitation." Shelley v.
Shelley, 223 Or. 328, 335, 354 P.2d 282, 285 (1960). Considered historically, complete
freedom of testation is not all that venerable. On the rise of freedom of testation under
the common law, see 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 240-
363 (2d ed. 1898).
217 See supra note 146.
218 "To allow the testator to interfere with the established rules of law, would be to
permit every man to make a law for himself, and disturb the metes and bounds of prop-
erty." 4 J. KENT, supra note 26, at *535. It should be pointed out that one donative
construct defies this principle: the spendthrift trust, to which the disclaimer bears some
functional resemblance (especially when coupled with surreptitious enjoyment of the
disclaimed property by the disclaimant). The primary argument for granting effective-
ness to spendthrift provisions has traditionally been the settlor's right to dispose of his
own property according to his wishes, despite the resulting distortion of debtor-creditor
law. Critics of spendthrift trusts have long remarked this anomaly and have opposed
their validity, inter alia, on the ground that the settlor should not be permitted to tamper
with established rules of law. See Costigan, Those Protective Trusts Which Are Miscalled
"Spendthrift Trusts" Reexamined, 22 CALIF. L. REV. 471,483-84 (1934); Note, A Rationale for
the Spendthrift Trust, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1324-25 (1964); Bushman, supra note 138,
at 317; Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 1189, 1237-40 & n.126 (1985). Even so, spendthrift trust doctrine requires the
settlor expressly to avow his intent to render the corpus immune to creditor levy, and
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At the other end of the scale, a rule that denied testators au-
thority to grant a right of insolvent disclaimer would appear to do
no great violence to their freedom of testation. Testators would
have it in their power to accomplish the same result, either by estab-
lishing solvency as a condition for a bequest's effectiveness, 21 9 or by
executing a new estate plan.2 20 Thus, even if an insolvent benefici-
ary lacked the right of disclaimer, the testator could carry out the
"disclaimer" for him. The difficulty, of course, is that, notwith-
standing the testator's theoretical freedom to keep his wealth out of
the hands of other men's creditors, as a practical matter his intent to
do so might be thwarted by inadvertence or incapacity. If a benefici-
ary were to become insolvent close in time to the testator's death,
for example, he might simply have no realistic opportunity to draft
and execute the necessary documents. Indeed, this outcome seems
most likely in connection with involuntary insolvency, the one situa-
tion where fraud theory suggests that inheritance be made nondis-
claimable. 22' For involuntary insolvency tends to occur
unpredictably and catastrophically, enhancing the risk to the unwary
testator.
These difficulties bring to mind a possible alternative approach
to the problem of intent effectuation. Even if lawmakers followed
fraud theory and barred insolvent disclaimer under some circum-
stances, they might simultaneously seek to give effect to testamen-
tary intent when construing the testator's will. Ordinarily, wills are
read according to their plain meaning, and it is up to the testator to
execute any changes of intent.222 Nonetheless, in certain special sit-
under most state statutes certain involuntary creditors' claims can nonetheless reach the
corpus. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 147, 152, 162, 168-69; supra note 157.
But see WASH. REV. CODE § 6.32.250 (West Supp. 1989) (inferring settlor's intent to
make every trust spendthrift). To give effect to the testator's probable intent to create a
right of insolvent disclaimer against all creditors thus carries intent effectuation beyond
even the "precedent" of spendthrift trust doctrine. On the policy underlying effectua-
tion (or non-effectuation) of probable intent, see infra text at notes 222-36.
219 Conditional bequests are valid unless the condition violates public policy. T.
ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 410-15. Solvency conditions generally have been upheld by
state courts but such conditions are ineffective to avoid a bequest in a federal bankruptcy
proceeding. Annotation, 138 A.L.R. 1336 (1942); 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(1)(B)(West
1988).
220 The testator would not have to disinherit his beneficiary: He might be able to
impress the bequest with a spendthrift trust. Alternatively, the testator could create a
discretionary power in his beneficiary, by granting him a general power of appointment
with a gift over in lieu of appointment after a short period. See supra note 113 (general
powers exempt from creditors' claims until exercised). This would precisely recreate
the beneficiary's power of disclaimer.
221 See supra notes 147-70 and accompanying text.
222 E.g., Warner v. Beach, 70 Mass. 162 (1855); Aten v. Tobias, 114 Kan. 646, 657-




uations courts have inferred unexpressed changes of intent and ef-
fectuated them "by operation of law," 2 23 on the assumption that the
testator's failure to do so could only have resulted from inability or
inadvertence. 224 Would this be an appropriate response to the
problem of insolvency? Should we infer an intent to revoke be-
quests to beneficiaries who become insolvent after a will is
executed?
One problem with such an approach is that it overgeneralizes
testamentary intent. A given testator's preference to revoke vel non
a bequest to an insolvent might turn on additional economic and
idiosyncratic considerations. Very likely, the degree of the benefici-
ary's insolvency, and hence the likelihood of bankruptcy or a
workout, would weigh heavily on the testator's decision. If bank-
ruptcy were all but inevitable, a testator would probably prefer to
avoid benefitting creditors who would otherwise be left without re-
course, unless the testator viewed satisfaction of creditors in itself as
a social or moral imperative. 225 Absent the prospect of bankruptcy,
however, the mere fact of the beneficiary's insolvency would seem
less likely to alter testamentary intent. In making his bequest, the
testator's purpose, presumably, was to facilitate spending by the
beneficiary. That purpose is accomplished by satisfying creditors
whose claims would in the alternative consume the beneficiary's fu-
ture earnings. Only if the testator happened to view insolvency as a
sign of wasteful spending might he be inclined to disinherit the bene-
ficiary under these conditions. In short, it is difficult to predict how
a particular testator will react to a particular beneficiary's financial
embarrassment. While most testators would probably grant insol-
vent beneficiaries the right to decide for themselves whether or not
to accept their inheritance, an inflexible rule of construed revoca-
223 Alteration of an estate plan by operation of law traditionally occurs when a will is
superseded by marriage, divorce, or birth of a child. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-301,
2-302, 2-508 (1982). The doctrine is ordinarily governed by statute today, though its
roots lie in the common law. See generally 2 W. PAGE, supra note 6, §§ 21.66-21.111, at
471-558; Graunke & Beuscher, The Doctrine of Implied Revocation of Wills by Reason of Change
in Domestic Relations of the Testator, 5 Wis. L. REV. 387 (1930); Durfee, Revocation of Wills By
Subsequent Change in the Condition or Circumstances of the Testator, 40 MICH. L. REV. 406
(1942).
224 E.g., Warner v. Beach, 70 Mass. 162, 163 (1855); 4 J. KENT, supra note 26, at
*521.
225 See supra text accompanying note 213. Additional considerations might be the
size of the inheritance relative to the beneficiary's indebtedness, his post-bankruptcy
need relative to that of other potential beneficiaries, and the opportunity for surrep-
ticious provision for the insolvent beneficiary. See Nielsen v. Cass County Social Servs.
Bd., 395 N.W.2d 157, 162 (N.D. 1986) (dissent) (generally expressing doubt that "our
society.., is at a place where we should assume that decedents would cast their relatives
on the welfare roles to reserve their estate for other family members").
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tion might frustrate as often as it fulfilled testamentary intent.226
Even assuming lawmakers could divine testators' intent with
some accuracy, the question remains whether effectuating unexe-
cuted changes of intent would serve public policy. As a principle of
construttion, testamentary intent effectuation derives from the tes-
tator's freedom of testation. But intent effectuation by operation of
law extends the principle to cases where the testator himself failed
to exercise the freedom he was offered. Is such an extension justi-
fied by the policies that underlie "basic" freedom of testation?
The traditional justifications for freedom of testation are sev-
eral. Perhaps oldest is the notion that testators enjoy a "natural
right" to choose the recipients of their property at death, following
from the natural privilege of all men to enjoy the fruits of their la-
bor. Locke, Grotius, and (in a metaphysical version) Leibnitz each
supported this view, but Blackstone and Jefferson rejected it on the
theory that one's natural rights over property cease at the moment
of one's death.227 Utilitarian philosophers such as Bentham and
Mill repudiated natural law entirely, insisting that lawmakers ground
inheritance (like every other secular institution) upon functional,
rather than moral, principles.228 Although it has informed a
number of judicial vindications of freedom of testation over the
years, natural rights theory carries little weight today. Certainly, no
modem court has elevated freedom of testation to the order of a
constitutional right.229
Modem defenses of freedom of testation rest upon the institu-
tion's social and economic utility. One line of argument (tracing
back to Blackstone, if not earlier) asserts that testamentary freedom
heightens social control, by creating incentives for obedience and
loyalty to one's family. 230 A second line of argument (also at least as
226 For this reason, courts have traditionally altered estate plans by operation of law
restrictively. See In re Adler's Estate, 52 Wash. 539, 548-49, 100 P. 1019, 1023 (1909).
227 R. CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY chs. 2-3 (1982). Leibnitz ar-
gued that the lifetime right to dispose of property carried over to the immoral soul-a
not-so-dead hand, as it were. L. MIRAGLIA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 748-50
(1921). Cf 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *10-11 ("We are apt to conceive at first
view that [inheritance] has nature on its side; yet we often mistake for nature what we
find established by long and inveterate custom.... For naturally speaking, the instant a
man ceases to be, he ceases to have any dominion .... ). See also the writings ofJeffer-
son and others quoted in R. CHESTER, supra, at 35-37.
228 R. CHESTER, supra note 227, at 17-20, 26-30. In a famous scoff, Bentham re-
ferred to natural law as "nonsense upon stilts." J. BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, in 2 THE
WORKS OFJEREMY BENTHAM 501 (J. Bowring ed. 1962).
229 See R. CHESTER, Supra note 227, chs. 3-4; 1 W. PAGE, supra note 6, § 3.1, at 62-67;
Laube, The Right of the Testator to Pauperize His Helpless Dependents, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 559-64
(1928).
230 J. BENTHAM, supra note 108, at 337; 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *11;
Brenner, Why did Inheritance Laws Change?, 5 INT. REV. L. & ECON. 91 (1985); Nathan, An
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old as Blackstone) posits that freedom of testation leads to optimal
levels of wealth creation and savings. 231 While neither of these jus-
tifications has escaped criticism, 23 2 they remain today's textual
orthodoxy.233
If one accepts that the fundamental rationale for freedom of
testation is motivational in nature-that it is designed to encourage
socially useful behavior by the testator and/or his potential benefi-
ciaries-then there would appear to be no functional advantage in
effectuating probable, as opposed to express, intent. The social
benefits of freedom of testation flow from the opportunity to exercise
testamentary intent during the testator's lifetime. Following the tes-
tator's death, no further behavioral utilities derive from reconstruct-
ing the testator's unexpressed intent.234 In fact, this conclusion
accords with the traditional scope of intent effectuation by operation
Assault on the Citadel. A Reection of Forced Heirship, 52 TUL. L. REV. 15-16 (1977); Sham-
mas, English Inheritance Law and Its Transfer to the Colonies, 31 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 145, 149-
50 (1987). Though Blackstone wrote in the late eighteenth century, the point had not
been lost on William Shakespeare three centuries earlier. See W. SHAKESPEARE, KING
LEAR (J. Bratton ed. 1987).
231 J. BENTHAM, supra note 108, at 338; 2 W., BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *11;
Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 139, 145 (1936); Gold, Freedom of
Testation, I MOD. L. REV. 296, 296-97 (1938); Tullock, Inheritance Justified, 14J.L. & ECON.
465 (1971).
232 E.g., J. WEDGWOOD, THE ECONOMICS OF INHERITANCE 213-16 (rev. ed. 1939)
(questioning the impact of freedom of testation on personal industry); Jenks, English
Civil Law, 30 HARV. L. REV. 109, 119-20 (1916) (same; also questioning the social utility
of the power to secure obedience via exercise of testamentary freedom).
233 T. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 34-35; 1 W. PAGE, supra note 6, § 1.7, at 26-30. Cf
Professor Simes's black-box approach: "The desire to dispose of property by will is very
general and very strong. A compelling argument in favor of it is that it accords with
human wishes." L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 21 (1955). Modem case
law has not explored the policy underpinnings of freedom of testation. For an early
judicial discussion, see Van Alst v. Hunter, 5 Johns. Cas. 148, 159-60 (N.Y. Ch. 1821)
(endorsing the social control theory).
234 Cf Fratcher, supra note 90, at 1077. Professor Fratcher argues that it would be
capricious not to comply with the testator's probable intent. He offers the example of a
son who incurs tort liability for negligent driving while his father lies on his deathbed.
If the collision had occurred a month before, the father could and proba-
bly would have devised his property to his grandchildren.... If the colli-
sion had occurred a month later, the son would have had an opportunity
to protect his wife and children by creating a trust of the property inher-
ited .... Why should the creditor be in a position to ruin the entire
family merely because of the happenstance that his claim arose while the
father was dying?
Id. Fratcher is certainly correct to conclude that the vulnerability of the inheritance be-
gins only shortly before the testator's death, but he is wrong to suggest that it ends
shortly thereafter. If the son transfers the inheritance to his wife and children he may
reduce his own vulnerability, but only by creating new vulnerabilities in them. (Of
course, it he attempts to transfer his inheritance after his collision he commits a fraudu-
lent conveyance.) In fact, the caprice argument has two sides: Just as the beneficiary can
complain of the "happenstance" that the testator died too soon, tort creditors can com-
plain of happenstance if the tort occurs too soon before his death!
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of law. Historically, courts have relaxed the requirement of strict
execution of all changes of intent only where such changes conform
with some independent public policy. 23 5 No such public policy fa-
vors the disinheritance of insolvents. On the contrary, as we have
seen, fraud theory suggests public policies in favor of providing for
insolvents in certain situations. 23 6
3. Forced Share
Having concluded that effectuation of the testator's probable
intent forms a weak policy foundation for disclaimer rules (as well as
rules of construction), one may go a step further and inquire
whether the law should enjoin testators to provide for their (involun-
tarily) insolvent heirs. While the common law does grant a "forced
share" to the surviving spouse of the testator, whatever her financial
state,23 7 lawmakers have never considered creating additional
forced shares contingent on insolvency.238 Does the law pay the
principle of testamentary freedom too much deference? Should
lawmakers ignore the testator's express intent as well as his prob-
able intent?
An in depth examination of the virtues and vices of freedom of
testation is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, it is worth
remarking that, for all its sanctification, 23 9 this fundamental princi-
ple of inheritance law has long been the subject of academic debate.
Against the Lockian "natural right" of testation, some commenta-
tors have posited a moral responsibility to provide for one's depen-
235 Alteration of an estate plan by operation of law as traditionally applied serves the
independent purpose of protection of the nuclear family from disinheritance, see Durfee,
supra note 223, at 416; Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance: Proposalfor Reform, 52 GEO.
L.J. 499, 507-08 (1964). Similarly, intestacy statutes-prescribing an entire estate plan
by operation of law in default of testation-are structured to accord with this same pur-
pose and only secondarily with testamentary intent. See Friedman,, The Law of the Living,
the Law of the Dead: Property, Succession and Society, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 340, 355, 358; cf
Fellows, Simon & Rau, Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succes-
sion Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCHJ. 321, 323-24. A state stat-
ute of the sort hypothesized here would in fact be ineffective in a federal bankruptcy
proceeding. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(1)(B)(West 1988).
236 See supra text accompanying notes 147-60. Does disinheritance of insolvents
serve the goal of protection of dependents from their creditors? To the extent this goal
exists, it is fulfilled by recourse to exemption law, homestead law, and the family allow-
ance, rather than alteration of an estate plan by operation of law. Cf infra note 258.
237 The implications of this forced share from the standpoint of creditors' rights
against the insolvent surviving spouse are addressed infra text accompanying notes 249-
71.
238 E.g., Gunn v. Wagner, 242 Iowa 1001, 1009, 48 N.W.2d 292, 296 (1951) ("Of
course testatrix was under no obligation to leave her property so it might be reached by
her husband's creditors"); Robertson v. Schard, 142 Iowa 500, 504, 119 N.W. 529, 531
(1909) ("The wife is under no obligation to give or devise to an insolvent husband her
own estate when she knows that it will be immediately absorbed by his creditors.").
239 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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dents following one's death.240 And opposite the economic
rationale of spurring testators to productivity, there stands the reali-
zation that a testator may lack incentives at death to distribute effi-
ciently the assets he has amassed during life. As one astute observer
has commented, "Making a will is an exercise in power without re-
sponsibility. ' 241 When persons act during their lifetimes, they must
live with the consequences. But persons acting at the moment of
death, quite literally, do not: They are free to act "irresponsibly"
without paying any of the economic or interpersonal costs that liv-
ing persons must bear for such behavior. 242 There is, in other
words, something close to a moral hazard of testation.243 Given this
fact, the possibility of placing further limitations on testamentary
freedom may be an appropriate subject for legislative
contemplation. 244
At any rate, the economic benefits of a forced share for (invol-
untarily) insolvent heirs are problematic, however one would ulti-
mately calculate the costs. Such a forced share would place at still
greater risk the inheritance of an insolvent tortfeasor, who could
otherwise have been disinherited and provided for surreptitiously.
This enhanced risk would further alleviate the moral hazard of insol-
vency.245 However, a forced share contingent on insolvency could
aggravate moral hazard in the case of an heir whom the testators
sought to disinherit for other reasons. Such an heir could have per-
240 E.g., Cahn, supra note 231, at 147; Haskell, supra note 235, at 506-08, 519-20;
Laube, supra note 229; Lehmann, In Defense of Forced Heirship, 52 TUL. L. REV. 20, 24-25
(1977); L. SIMES, supra note 233, at 23-25; Nathan, supra note 230, at 15-16.
241 Meston, The Power of the Will, 1982 JURID. REV. 172, 173. See G. HEGEL, PHILOSO-
PHY OF RIGHT § 179, at 119 (T. Knox trans. 1952).
242 This fact, in turn, speaks to the issue of whether freedom of testation is socially
beneficial. See supra text accompanying note 230. A number of commentators point out
that arbitrary exercise of freedom of testation could function to destroy the social cohe-
sion of the family. See, e.g., T. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 34; G. HEGEL, supra note 241,
§ 180, at 120; M. SUSSMAN,J. CATES & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 4 (1970).
See also supra note 232.
243 For a related analysis, see R. POSNER, supra note 147, at 481-86. Apart from
limiting freedom of testation, one could internalize the social externalities associated
with death by dialing forward the process of probate. Antemortem probate has, in fact,
long been proposed, and it is now optional in several states. Though traditionally advo-
cated in order to cure the evidentiary problems associated with postmortem probate,
antemortem probate could also be justified on a mandatory basis to reduce the moral
hazard of testation. See generally Cavers, Antemortem Probate: An Essay in Preventive Law, 1
U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1934); Fink, Antemorten Probate Revisited: Can an Idea Have Life After
Death?, 37 OHmO ST. L.J. 264 (1976); Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model,
77 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1978); Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate, 78 MICH. L. REV.
1066 (1980).
244 To some extent, such contemplation may go on covertly in the jury box when a
will is contested. See Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise,
53 YALE L.J. 271 (1944).
245 See supra text accompanying note 155.
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verse incentives to engage in tortious activity. 24 6 Similar ambigui-
ties arise in connection with other forms of involuntary
insolvency. 247 Thus, no powerful case can be made on economic
grounds to restrict freedom of testation in this context. Nor is there
a powerful case to be made on moral grounds. Whatever the testa-
tor's moral responsibility toward his heirs, he surely owes no moral
obligation to his heirs' creditors, with whom he has had no direct
relation. 248 In short, even from the standpoint of fraud theory
alone, a forced share for insolvent heirs would not accord unequivo-
cally with public policy.
IV
COGNATE PROBLEMS
Along with insolvent disclaimer, a number of related problems
merit consideration. These problems raise not only specific ques-
tions of public policy, but also broader issues of structural
consistency.
A. Right of Election
Suppose that the insolvent beneficiary under a will happens to
be the testator's surviving spouse. Cognizant of the spouse's insol-
vency, the testator impresses her inheritance in a spendthrift trust
or disinherits her entirely. Ordinarily, the beneficiary's creditors
would have no remedy here: Having taken the opportunity to shield
his wealth from a beneficiary's creditors, the testator has mooted the
issue of insolvent disclaimer. A surviving spouse, however, enjoys
rights that ordinary beneficiaries do not. In common law jurisdic-
tions she may exercise her right of election, entitling her to receive a
fraction of the net estate irrespective of the provisions of the will.249
In the usual case, the surviving spouse would exercise this right
where the testator refused to grant her the statutory minimum. But
246 Cf supra note 155.
247 In the context of alimony and child support debtors, economic efficiency is at-
tained by imposing the cost on the deeper pocket. See supra notes 156-58 and accompa-
nying text. If the debtor would remain the covert beneficiary upon disinheritance, then
a forced share will be efficient, for the debtor has been judicially determined to be the
deeper pocket. If, however, the debtor is disinherited for other reasons, and would not
thereby benefit covertly, then we do not know who is in greater need-the creditor or
the alternative beneficiary. Thus, the efficiency of a forced share would be problematic.
248 As far as the testator's ostensible moral responsibility toward his heirs is con-
cerned, even if we acknowledged that such a responsibility existed (which we need not,
cf supra note 240) it would not point toward a forced share for insolvents: Such heirs
would generally prefer to be disinherited and provided for covertly.
249 Elective share statutes vary in the amount that they guarantee to the surviving
spouse and in other details. See generally Kulzer, Property and the Family: Spousal Protection,
4 Rur.-CAM. L.J. 195 (1973).
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in the instant case, the disinherited spouse might well prefer to re-
ceive less, in order to thwart her creditors. The question then arises
whether the spouse's failure to exercise a right of election while in-
solvent constitutes a fraudulent conveyance.
Despite the diversity of rules governing insolvent disclaimer,
states unanimously deny creditors the right to control spousal elec-
tions.250 The cases have articulated no exception for reliance or
even for collusion between the legatees and the surviving spouse.251
In reaching this result, courts have once again focused on the ab-
stractions of title theory, coupled with the theme of transactional
freedom that underlies inheritance law. Unlike a devise, title to the
elective share "vests" only upon election, and the decision to elect
vel non is a "personal right" of the surviving spouse.252 Curiously,
the countervailing arguments associated with fraudulent conveyance
law are nowhere to be found in these cases. 255
Considered from the standpoint of dominion theory, the non-
exercise of a right of election at one level appears equivalent to a
disclaimer: Both entail the rejection of testamentary assets that the
spouse can obtain by the stroke of a pen; both are quasi-convey-
ances, in that the spouse knows, but cannot control, who will receive
the estate in lieu of election. 254 At another level, however, the elec-
250 See the cases compiled in Annotation, 27 A.L.R. 472 (1923); Annotation, supra
notes 47, at 651-60; 5 W. PAGE, supra note 6, § 47.16, at 625 nn.6-7. (The issue does not
appear to have arisen in community property states, where debts of the surviving spouse
are ordinarily debts of the community as well, see W. FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES
OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§ 209-13, 218 (2d ed. 1971)). Spousal election is to be dis-
tinguished from "equitable election," where the testator bequeaths property to the ben-
eficiary, but also "bequeaths" some portion of the beneficiary's own property.
Ordinarily, in such a case, the beneficiary may "elect" to take under the will in exchange
for transferring his own property as directed under the will, or to take and transfer noth-
ing. If the beneficiary is insolvent, however, he cannot equitably elect to give away more
than he receives without making a fraudulent conveyance. See Tripp v. Nobles, 136 N.C.
99, 48 S.E. 675 (1904).
251 But see Dalisa v. Dumoff, 206 Misc. 259, 260-61, 132 N.Y.S.2d 550, 551 (Sup. Ct.
1954) (noting the absence of any allegation or proof of collusion, without stating what
significance such allegation or proof would have had).
252 E.g., Traudt v. Hagerman, 27 Ind. App. 150, 154, 60 N.E. 1011, 1012-13 (1901)
("It is a matter solely between the husband and wife"); Robertson v. Schard, 142 Iowa
500, 503-04, 119 N.W. 529, 530-31 (1909); Bottom v. Fultz, 124 Ky. 302, 303, 98 S.W.
1037, 1038 (Ct. App. 1907); In re Fleming's Estate, 217 Pa. 610, 615, 66 A. 874, 876
(1907); Deutsch v. Rohlfing, 22 Colo. App. 543, 553, 126 P. 1123, 1126 (1912). Many
state statutes granting the elective share expressly specify that the right is personal to
the surviving spouse (as does the UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-203 (1982)); the remaining
states are silent on the matter. Cf Watson v. Watson, 13 Conn. 83 (1839) (denying
surviving spouse the right to refuse dower or curtesy on the ground that these rights
vest eo instanti by operation of law); Lahr v. Ulmer, 27 Ind. App. 107, 60 N.E. 1009
(1901) (election was assumed under statute that required affirmative non-election within
90 days.).
253 See supra text accompanying note 45.
254 See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
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tive share appears more solidly under the dominion of the spouse
than an ordinary bequest. Like the spouse's right to community
property, to which it is alternative, the spouse's right of election
proceeds from the assumption that she has contributed to the testa-
tor's wealth. 255 As a consequence, the law, at least in theory, estop-
pes the testator from denying his spouse a portion of his estate.
The elective share thus comprises more than a mere expectancy.
Although it does not mature until the testator's death, and is contin-
gent upon survival, the elective share resembles a valuable chose-in-
action; it is not a gratuitous transfer at all. 25 6 From the perspective
of dominion theory, then, creditors have, if anything, a stronger claim
to the elective share than they do to an ordinary bequest.
Studied by way of inheritance theory, the right to decline the
elective share is premised on the personal autonomy of the surviv-
ing spouse. But autonomy merits deference only where its curtail-
ment would entail onerous burdens or moral obligations.257 The
testator is powerless to impose such obligations when the spouse
exercises her right of election, because receipt of the elective share
is not a transaction in the usual sense. It is a transfer occasioned by
the surviving spouse alone, in defiance of the testator's expressed in-
tent. Given this fact, the preservation of personal autonomy fails to
justify a right to decline the elective share. Lawmakers could man-
date insolvent election with confidence that it would impose no
255 This rationale is remarkably venerable. The preamble to North Carolina's
Dower statute of 1784 states that "it is highly just and reasonable that those who by their
Prudence, Economy and Industry, have contributed to raise up an estate to their Hus-
bands, should be entitled to share in it." Quoted in L. SIMES, supra note 233, at 13-14.
For modern discussions, see H. MARSH, JR., MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS
136 (1952); Kulzer, supra note 249, at 214-17; Clark, The Recapture of Testanentary Substi-
tutes to Preserve the Spouse's Elective Share: An Appraisal of Recent Statutory Reforms, 2 CONN. L.
REV. 513 & n.2 (1970);.Langbein & Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share, 22
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 303, 306-10 (1987); Phipps, Martial Property Interests, 27 RocKY
MTN. L. REV. 180-81, 186-87, 190 (1955). To some extent, such contributions may un-
derlie all "gratuitous" transfer. See supra text accompanying notes 202-05. In the case of
a spouse, however, the contribution is sufficiently manifest to be deemed meritorious of
mandatory testamentary compensation.
256 See Walker v. Walker, 66 N.H. 390, 393, 31 A. 14, 16 (1891) ("Marriage is
equivalent to a pecuniary consideration; that is to say, it is a valuable consideration. The
plaintiff's right to her distributory share of her husband's large estate, and which is quite
likely to have been one of the inducements to her marriage with him, is therefore in the
nature of an actual purchase of that right."). The surviving spouse's claim is sometimes
likened to that of a creditor or "quasi-creditor." See W. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE
WIDOW'S SHARE 259-63 (1960). For other scholarly characterizations, see Kulzer, supra
note 249, at 206; R. POSNER, supra note 147, at 486-87. See also Haskell, supra note 235,
at 508-10 (asserting an inconsistency between the legal treatment of spousal claims and
creditors' claims). Cf In re Harris, 351 Pa. 368, 379, 41 A.2d 715, 720 (1945) ("It is a
mere personal privilege and is not property") (citation omitted); In re Fleming's Estate,
217 Pa. 610, 615-16, 66 A. 874, 877 (1907).
257 See supra text accompanying notes 202-10.
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hardship on the surviving spouse.258
A number of courts have defended the spouse's right to repudi-
ate the elective share on the ground that such a decision comports
with the testator's own estate plan-it being "the manifest policy of
the law" to effectuate testamentary intent whenever possible. 259
This argument is analogous to the proposition, encountered earlier,
that granting beneficiaries an unfettered right of disclaimer com-
ports with the testator's "probable intent." 260 But, if the policy of
intent effectuation has any merit in the context of disclaimers, 26' it
has none in connection with the elective share. The very essence of
the right of election is the notion that testamentary intent loses its
relevance where the spouse's share is concerned. 26 2 Were we to
consult the intent of the testator, the right of election would disap-
pear entirely.
Viewed finally in the light of fraud theory, the problem of insol-
vent non-election appears virtually identical to the problem of insol-
vent disclaimer. Given the opportunity, most contract creditors
would no sooner rely on the debtor's right of election than on her
expectancies: Here again, the difficulties of acquiring information
and of arriving at a meaningful valuation would loom large.
Though the elective share is unavoidable in law, it is avoidable in
fact-with or without the spouse's blessing-by transforming the es-
tate into non-probate assets, for example. 263 Given this practical
258 The personal right of non-election might be justified as a means of protecting
the surviving spouse from impoverishment at the hands of her creditors, if one assumed
that the rejected elective share could be captured surreptitiously, see supra note 37.
However, the elective share traditionally has not been rationalized as part of the core
"safety net" for dependents. Thus, unlike homestead rights and the family allowance,
elective assets do not constitute exempt property. See H. MARSH, JR., supra note 255, at
136. Cf., Robertson v. Schard, 142 Iowa 500, 503-04, 119 N.W. 529, 531 (1909).
259 In re Fleming's Estate, 217 Pa. 610, 615, 66 A. 874, 876 (1907); Traudt v. Hager-
man, 27 Ind. App. 150, 60 N.E. 1011 (1901); Note, Renunciation of a Devise, supra note 37,
at 947.
260 See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
261 See supra text accompanying notes 211-36.
262 Thus, by analogy, the testator's intent is irrelevant to the issue of whether a
guardian will elect on behalf of an incompetent surviving spouse.
It may be well to note that the widow's rights are as ancient as the hus-
band's right to dispose of his property, and have always received particu-
lar protection by both the Legislature and the courts. It is not true
historically to suggest that the husband's testamentary plans have ever
been superior to or deserving of greater honor than the widow's rights to
take against the will.
Estate of Strauch, 11 Ohio App. 2d 173, 178, 229 N.E.2d 95, 99 (1967); cf Carey v.
Brown, 194 Minn. 127, 260 N.W. 320 (1935) (holding the testator's intent to be signifi-
cant to the extent that an inference can be drawn that the incompetent spouse would
have preferred to comply with the decedent's wishes); In re Hansen's Guardianship, 67
Utah 256, 247 P. 481 (1926) (same); In re Connor's Estate, 254 Mo. 65, 162 S.W. 252
(1914) (same).
263 Evasion of the elective share is addressed at length in W. MACDONALD, supra note
1989] 643
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
power, the chose-in-action embodied by the right of election as-
sumes a character almost as evanescent as an ordinary bequest.2 64'
Those creditors who nonetheless prefer to assure themselves of re-
course to the elective share can contract for the privilege by includ-
ing a promise of election in the credit agreement.2 65 It seems
unlikely, however, that creditors as a class would insist on such as-
surances when they establish the price of credit. 266
At the same time, the analysis earlier presented in favor of bar-
ring insolvent disclaimer against involuntary creditors pertains
equally to insolvent non-election. 267 As in the case of insolvent dis-
claimer, however, courts thus far have made no allowance for the
attributes of the spouse's indebtedness, 268 save (once again) in the
special context of Medicaid eligibility. 269
In sum, public policy appears to suggest that no distinction be
made between insolvent non-election and insolvent disclaimer.
Nonetheless, states that permit the former have not hesitated to bar
the latter.270 Why they have done so remains a mystery, though the
256. We need not here detail "the fifty ways to leave your lover-broke," but the ease
with which it can be accomplished is well known to practitioners. See, e.g., Laufer, Flexible
Restraints on Testamentary Freedom-A Report on Decedents' Family Maintenance Legislation, 69
HARV. L. REv. 277, 280 (1955).
264 The want of reasonable reliance is noted (if somewhat elliptically) in Bains v.
Globe Bank & Trust Co., 136 Ky. 332, 334, 124 S.W. 343, 344 (Ct. App. 1910); see also
Traudt v. Hagerman, 27 Ind. App. 150, 154, 60 N.E. 1011, 1012 (1901).
265 Such a promise is supported by consideration and would presumably be enforce-
able. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-204 (1982) (giving effect to contractual waivers of the
elective share). A guarantee by the testator himself would, of course, be even more
useful to the creditor.
266 See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
267 See supra text accompanying notes 147-60. One case distinguishes the problem
of non-election from disclaimer on the ground that it would be improper to "equate
nonaction and action." Bradley v. Hill, 457 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970). But
there is nothing improper about the equation when nonaction and action are function-
ally equivalent. See supra note 112. Notice also that under many state statutes, a spouse
may waive her right of election ex ante. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-204 (1982). In
order to be effective, a rule barring insolvent non-election would also have to bar insol-
vent waiver of the right of election.
268 In one case, for example, the creditor obtained a judgment in a wrongful death
action against the debtor (who was also convicted of manslaughter for killing the credi-
tor's husband). The debtor subsequently refused to exercise his right of election against
his deceased wife's estate. The court held that the creditor could not compel election.
"The judgment creditor ... relies upon what she terms equitable principles .... Be-
cause of the particularly unique facts, this argument presents a strong appeal. However,
this court may not, because of these facts, fail to be controlled by applicable legal princi-
ples." In re Savage, 650 S.W.2d 346, 350 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
269 Flynn v. Gates, 67 A.D.2d 975, 413 N.Y.S.2d 446 (App. Div. 1979) (holding that
failure to exercise one's right of election was a valid cause for denial of Medicaid assist-
ance) (this case is the elective-share analogue to Scrivani, discussed supra text accompa-
nying notes 77-87). Contra Bradley v. Hill, 457 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
270 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-203 (West 1986); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2206 (Purdon's
Supp. 1987); In re Fleming's Estate, 217 Pa. 610, 66 A. 874 (1907); In re Harris, 351 Pa.
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widespread failure of courts to relate non-election and disclaimer
provides a powerful clue.27 1 Surely, the phenomenon of legal com-
partmentalization must be our prime suspect.
B. Will Contests
Suppose a beneficiary submits for probate a will that disinherits
the testator's insolvent heir (or devisee under a prior valid will), or
that impresses his inheritance in a spendthrift trust. The proffered
will may be vulnerable to challenge on any number of grounds, 272
but the insolvent heir, preferring the will that disinherits him, may
decline to contest it. Can the insolvent heir's creditors subrogate
themselves to his right of contest and bring suit themselves to en-
sure the heir's inheritance? Put otherwise, does the insolvent heir's
refusal to bring suit himself constitute a fraud upon his creditors?
The right to contest a will is statutory. Most of the relevant
statutes limit standing to "interested parties," meaning parties who
hold a pecuniary interest in the outcome. Yet the statutes fail to
spell out how direct the pecuniary interest must be.2 73 In the major-
ity of states, creditors of the heir who acquire a pre- or post-judg-
368, 41 A.2d 715 (1945). In jurisdictions that bar insolvent disclaimer, an insolvent
surviving spouse might find it to her advantage to elect against a will that neglects to
disinherit her. Election in this situation would not be as efficient as disclaimer, but it
could serve to reduce the inheritance where disclaimer was forbidden. While no case
testing this option has arisen, there is dicta supporting its validity. See Fleming's Estate,
217 Pa. at 614, 66 A. at 876; Savage, 650 S.W.2d at 351. This scenario highlights the
absurdity of a distinction in the treatment of disclaimer and election.
271 Two cases that do look to treatment of disclaimers for purpose of analogy are
Bottom v. Fultz, 124 Ky. 302, 307, 98 S.W. 1037, 1038 (Ct. App. 1907); Dalisa v.
Dumoff, 206 Misc. 259, 261, 132 N.Y.S.2d 550, 552 (Sup. Ct. 1954). Both of these
cases were decided in states that permit insolvent disclaimer. Thus the analogy sup-
ported the traditional right of non-election. By contrast, in Pennsylvania, where prece-
dent proscribed insolvent disclaimer, the right of insolvent non-election was justified in
Fleming's Estate, 217 Pa. at 614, 66 A. at 877, by equating non-election with non-exercise
of a power of appointment. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
272 The litany includes mis-execution under the statute of wills, testamentary inca-
pacity, undue influence, forgery, duress, and fraud.
273 "An interest resting on sentiment or sympathy, or on any basis other than gain
or loss of money or its equivalent it not sufficient." In re Duffy's Estate, 228 Iowa 426,
434, 292 N.W. 165, 169 (1940). On statutory language, see 3 W. PAGE, supra note 6,
§ 26.52, at 117-18. Cases on point are collected in Annotation, 128 A.L.R. 963 (1940);
Annotation, 46 A.L.R. 1490 (1926). For commentary, 1 G. GLENN, supra note 5, § 141,
at 261-62; Kerson, Creditors and the Will Contest, 14 HASTINGS LJ. 18 (1962); Recent Deci-
sion, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 449 (1952); Note, Wills, Probate: Who Allay Contest?, 12 CORNELL
L.Q. 247 (1927); Note, Right of Persons Claiming Through an Heir to Contest a Will, 27 IoWA
L. REv. 443 (1942); Note, The Right of a Creditor of an Heir to Contest the Will, 50 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 309 (1974) [hereinafter Note, The Right of a Creditor]; Recent Decision, 27
NOTRE DAME LAw. 659 (1952); Comment, Lien Creditor Permitted to Contest Will Disinheriting
Debtor, 4 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1952); Recent Case, 5 VAND. L. REV. 857 (1952); Recent
Case, 2 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 166 (1940); Note, Wills-Probate-Judgment Creditor of Disin-
herited Heir Not Privileged to Caveat Will, 36 YALE LJ. 150 (1926) [hereinafter Note, Wills].
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mentjudicial lien against the estate (but not general creditors) have
been held "interested" on the theory that the lien in and of itself
constitutes a property right whose value will be enhanced if the con-
test succeeds. 274 By contrast, courts in other states have denied
standing to any creditor, on the theory that a judicial lien is "rather
in the nature of a remedy than an estate," and hence fails to qualify
as an immediate "right of ownership" upon the success of the con-
test. 275 For purposes of accomplishing public policy, a more barren
vista for analysis could scarcely be imagined. 276
Applying the tools of dominion theory, the characteristics of
the insolvent heir's refusal to contest a will appear to depend on the
nature of its vulnerability. If the creditor's contest were predicated
on some irregularity outside the heir's control-such as testamen-
tary incapacity or a technical violation of the statute of wills-then
his failure to initiate the contest himself is simply another quasi-con-
veyance: In this situation, the heir knows, but cannot decide, who
will receive the property absent a contest. 277 If, however, the credi-
tor seeks to challenge the will on grounds of misconduct-claiming,
say, forgery, or undue influence by the heir in order to disinherit him-
se/f 27 8-then the heir allegedly has assumed control over the prop-
erty's disposition, as if he had assigned it. So far, courts have drawn
274 E.g., the pithy discussion in In re Langevin's Will, 45 Minn. 429, 47 N.W. 1133
(1891) (judgment lien), or the more extended discourse in In re Duffy's Estate, 228 Iowa
426, 292 N.W. 165 (1940) (judgment lien). Though the issue has arisen most frequently
in connection with judgment liens, dicta in judgment lien cases often draw a broader
lien creditor/general creditor distinction, e.g., Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo. 333, 346-47,
48 S.W. 478, 481-82 (1898), and there are also cases directly on point, e.g., Seward v.
Johnson, 27 R.I. 396, 62 A. 569 (1905) (attachment lien); Marcus v. Pearce Woolen
Mills, 353 Mass. 483, 233 N.E.2d 29 (1968) (attachment lien); Bloor v. Platt, 78 Ohio St.
46, 84 N.E. 604 (1908) (execution lien). Whether a lien against the estate is effective
prior to distribution depends upon state law. 6 W. PAGE, supra note 6, § 59.20, at 438-
40; Kerson, supra note 273, at 25-27. Thus, creditors unable to obtain a levy even after
judgment would be barred from initiating a will contest. See In re Estate of Peterson, 716
P.2d 801 (Utah 1986). Old cases in only one state have granted standing to general
creditors of the beneficiary to contest a will, see Mullins v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Baltimore, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1077, 100 S.W. 256 (Ct. App. 1907); Brooks v. Paine's Ex'rs.,
123 Ky. 271, 90 S.W. 600 (Ct. App. 1906); Davies v. Leete, 111 Ky. 659, 662, 64 S.W.
441, 442 (Ct. App. 1901) (dicta).
275 E.g., Lee v. Keech, 151 Md. 34, 37-38, 133 A. 835, 836 (Ct. App. 1926); In re
Estate of Peterson, 716 P.2d at 801. The issue is debated in majority and dissenting
opinions in In re Harootenian's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 242, 238 P.2d 992 (1951).
276 See Note, Wills, Probate: Who May Contest?, supra 273, at 250-51; In re Duffy's Es-
tate, 228 Iowa 426, 434, 292 N.W. 165, 174 (1940).
277 See supra text accompanying note Ill. As a practical matter, what appears to be a
quasi-conveyance may still be equivalent to a full-fledged conveyance due to collusion
between the heir and the devisee under the will. See supra note 37.
278 Of course, such a complaint stands on its head the usual allegation that forgery,
undue influence and other forms of misconduct have been used to augment the wrong-
doer's share. Nonetheless, courts that grant creditors standing have acknowledged the
legitimacy of a complaint of wrongdoing to reduce one's share, on the assumption that
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no distinction between different sorts of contests on this basis,
though such an approach would seem a natural analogue to the
"collusion exception" to insolvent disclaimer rules. 279
Examined under inheritance theory, a grant of standing to cred-
itors appears to interfere with the transactional freedom of neither
heir nor testator. Heirs, surely, have no cause to object to a credi-
tor's will contest as an infringement of their autonomy. Only dis-
claimer laws determine whether heirs must assume the burden of
unwanted gifts. As for the testator, a will contest neither violates
nor vindicates his intent. Some courts have suggested en passant that
creditors' will contests (unlike limitations on disclaimer) affirma-
tively serve to fulfill testamentary intent. If the rightful heir is insol-
vent, only creditors may have an incentive to challenge an invalid
(intent non-effectuating) will. Indeed, the heir himself may be guilty
of substituting his own intent for that of the testator. 280 But the flaw
in this reasoning is its failure to consider in turn the beneficiaries'
intent. So long as no rightful heir objects to the distribution under
an invalid or even forged will, the beneficiaries are, in effect, exercis-
ing their right vis-a-vis the testator to re-distribute inherited assets
among themselves. 28 ' Their amicable probate of an invalid will is
thus substantively equivalent to an amicable division following in-
testacy. But even while a will contest initiated by creditors does no
service on the testator's behalf, it certainly does no violence to his
freedom of testation.282
Studied finally by way of fraud theory, the issue of creditor
standing generates our familiar analytical dichotomy. Voluntary
the debtor who thereby thwarts his creditors can benefit surreptitiously. See, e.g., Brooks
v. Paine's Ex'rs., 123 Ky. 271, 274, 90 S.W.2d 600, 601 (Ct. App. 1906).
279 For cases denying standing despite allegations of misconduct, see In re Shepard's
Estate, 170 Pa. St. 323, 32 A. 1040 (1895) (creditor's allegation of forgery); Bank of
Tennessee v. Nelson, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 634 (1859); Lockard v. Stephenson, 120 Ala.
641, 24 So. 996 (1899); Lee v. Keech, 151 Md. 34, 133 A. 835 (Ct. App. 1926). But see
Brooks v. Paine's Ex'rs, 123 Ky. at 275, 90 S.W. at 601 (citing misconduct as a ground
from granting standing to creditors per se). Nor have cases articulated an exception for
collusion between the heir and the beneficiary under the contestable will, cf supra note
37.
280 See, e.g, In re Duffy's Estate, 228 Iowa 426, 434, 292 N.W. 165, 172 (1940);
Brooks v. Paine's Ex'rs., 123 Ky. at 274, 90 S.W. at 601; Bloor v. Platt, 78 Ohio St. 46, 84
N.E. 604, 605 (1908); Recent Case, 2 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 169 (1940); Note, Wills, supra
note 273, at 151.
281 This would not be true if the testator sought to place a bequest in trust. In that
case, however, the testator's intent will be vindicated in a contest brought by the pur-
ported trustee. Intervention by creditors is not necessary.
282 But see Note, Renunciation, supra note 90, at 161, arguing, incomprehensibly, that a
rule permitting creditors to contest a will is "but a short leap" from a rule granting
insolvent heirs a forced share, and hence confounds testamentary intent. The author ap-
pears to assume that a vulnerable will reflects the testator's true intent, contrary to the
usual assumption is that it does not.
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creditors who do not rely on the debtor's opportunities to inherit
have no legitimate interest in the matter, even where the debtor has
engaged in wrongdoing to avoid the testator's estate plan. 283 How-
ever, for the sake of economic utility as well as morality, involuntary
creditors ought to have standing to exercise every right available to
the debtor, including his right to contest a will.284 As of yet, how-
ever, no court has advanced such a dual analysis. 285
In denying standing to creditors, some courts have raised an
additional concern: administrative efficiency. Probate is ordinarily
a summary proceeding. Were creditors empowered to intervene in
probate, they might open the proverbial floodgates of litigation.
Small claimants could end up disrupting the settlement of large es-
tates. 286 This fear appears to be unfounded. Historically, creditors
have rarely initiated actions of any sort to reach their debtors' inher-
itances, if only because few creditors possessed the requisite infor-
mation. 287 In addition, the cost of bringing suit operates to deter
small claims. If experience is any guide, a broadened grant of stand-
ing would not deluge the courts with expensive and time-consuming
will contests-especially if standing were restricted to involuntary
creditors.
Other courts have cited related concerns as grounds for limit-
ing creditor standing. One court has rationalized the restriction of
standing to lien creditors as a means of averting strike suits. The
lien requirement obliges the heir's creditor first to demonstrate the
bona fides of his claim, whether at trial or, in the case of pre-judg-
ment liens, at a preliminary hearing, before becoming eligible to
contest the will. Thus, the creditor's opportunities for harassment
283 See supra text accompanying notes 129-35, 183. The absence of reasonable reli-
ance is cited as a ground for denying creditor standing in In re Shepard's Estate, 170 Pa.
St. 323, 325, 32 A. 1040, 1041 (1895); Lockard v. Stephenson, 120 Ala. 641, 642, 24 So.
996, 996-97 (1898); but cf., Recent Decision, 27 NOTRE DAM E LAW. 662 (1952) (defend-
ing creditor standing on the basis of his moral right to satisfaction, discussed supra text
accompanying notes 121-25). Individual creditors who wish to avoid a rule denying
standing can presumably contract around it by adding to the credit agreement a promise
to pursue all inheritance claims or by including a transfer of this right to the creditor.
Such a contract should be valid. See In re Harootenian's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 242, 247, 238
P.2d 992, 998 (1951); 2 W. PAGE, supra note 6, § 25.2, at 613-18.
284 See supra text accompanying notes 147-60.
285 See, e.g., San Diego Trust & Say. Bank v. Heustis, 121 Cal. App. 67, 10 P.2d 158
(1932); In re Harootenian's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 242, 238 P.2d 992 (1951) (will contests
brought by support creditors; cases analyzed under traditional "interested party" stan-
dard). No case has yet resolved the effect of a refusal to contest a will on Medicaid
eligibility. Cf supra note 269.
286 See Shepard's Estate, 170 Pa. St. at 327, 32 A. at 1041; Burk v. Morain, 223 Iowa
399, 404, 272 N.W. 441, 444 (1937); Harootenian's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d at 253, 238 P.2d at
998 (Edmonds, J., dissenting).
287 Those states that do permit contests by creditors have not experienced a high
volume of such litigation. Note, The Right of a Creditor, supra note 273, at 318.
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are narrowed considerably.288 Another court has questioned the
wisdom of granting standing to pre-judgment creditors, with or
without a lien. Absent a judgment requirement, creditors still have
to predicate standing on their status as valid claimants against the
heir. Standing by creditors holding unliquidated claims can thus be
disputed on substantive grounds. Yet probate courts may be institu-
tionally unfit to try such claims, and the need to do so would unduly
prolong the probate proceeding.289
While not entirely unpersuasive, these arguments call for limi-
tations on standing that are otherwise anomalous under modem
statutes. Since the creditor who initiates a will contest seeks to
avoid what is functionally a fraudulent conveyance, the extent of
creditors' standing to challenge other sorts of fraudulent transfers
would seem pertinent.29 0 Though creditors under the original stat-
ute of 13 Elizabeth had to reduce their claims to judgment or obtain
a pre-judgment lien as a prerequisite to standing,29' neither require-
ment appears in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act or the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.2 9 2 Though these statutes may
give false claimants greater opportunities to venture strike suits,
they also protect the holders of meritorious claims against dilatory
tactics by debtors.2 93 Focusing on the latter side of the coin, most
commentators have praised the broadened grant of standing under
the uniform acts as a helpful "reform," despite its potential for
abuse. 294
The fact that the fraudulent conveyance at issue here involves a
288 Marcus v. Pearce Woolen Mills, 353 Mass. 483, 485, 233 N.E.2d 29, 30 (1968).
The court viewed the lien requirement as striking a "balance" between protection of the
estate from false claims and protection of the rights of genuine creditors. Id at 486, 233
N.E.2d at 30.
289 Harootenian's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d at 252, 238 P.2d at 998 (Carter, J., concurring).
However, the requirement ofajudgment lien, as opposed to a mere judgment, has been
criticized as capricious, see id. at 252, 253-54, 238 P.2d at 998, 999-1000.
290 This analogy was made to establish the breadth of creditor standing in In re Kalt's
Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 813, 108 P.2d 401, 404 (1940) (dicta).
291 1 G. GLENN, supra note 5, §§ 80, 85, at 133-36, 144-45. The British statute of 13
Eliz. ch. 5 (1571) was received into American law in some states by statutory enactment
and in others as part of the common law, see id. § 58, at 79-81. It survives to this day in
a number ofjurisdictions, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-9-6 (1984).
292 U.F.C.A. §§ 9-10, 7A U.L.A. 577-78, 630 (1918) U.F.T.A. § 7, id. 660 (1984); 1
G. GLENN, supra note 5, § 76, at 128-29. However, a general creditor under U.F.C.A. is
required to have at least brought suit on the claim before acquiring standing to avoid the
debtor's fraudulent conveyance. McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act, 46 HARV. L. REv. 404, 438 n. 170 (1933). By analogy, the same requirement
should apply to general creditors seeking standing to contest a will.
293 American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 9-10, 166 N.E. 783, 785 (1929)
(policy analysis by Cardozo, J.).
294 E.g., 1 G. GLENN, supra note 5, § 83, at 142-43; Kennedy, The Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act, 18 U.C.C. LJ. 195, 197-98 (1986). But see Current Legislation, 20 COLUM. L.
REv. 341 (1920).
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probate estate would not seem to change the policy equation signifi-
cantly. While the opportunity for a strike suit may be marginally
greater,295 so is the risk of dilatory tactics by the debtor: For pro-
bate is an in rem proceeding, and under many state statutes the de-
cree of distribution is conclusive on all parties. 296 Accordingly, if
the debtor were able to fend off his creditor's suit on the claim until
the estate was closed, the creditor seeking to contest the will could
be left without a remedy. 297 Lawmakers have not permitted the
structural limitations of probate courts or the public policy in favor
of closing estates expeditiously to stand in the way of creditor relief
in similar cases. In no jurisdiction must a creditor of the decedent
(as opposed to the heir) obtain a lien or judgment before asserting
his claim against the estate, even though the very same difficulties
are involved. In some states, the probate court is itself competent to
resolve unliquidated claims; in others, distribution is delayed pend-
ing resolution of the claim at common law, or immediate distribu-
tion may be conditioned upon the posting of bond to meet the
contingency that the claim will subsequently be vindicated in full. 298
If such procedures are followed in the relatively common case of
disputed claims against the estate, there seems no reason to follow a
different procedure in the rare situation where a general creditor of
the heir seeks to challenge the will. 29 9
However one evaluates these various issues, it is plainly advisa-
295 By initiating a will contest, the creditor delays distribution of the estate, though it
will continue to generate interest; whereas, when a creditor seeks to avoid an ordinary
fraudulent conveyance, the property is already in the hands of the transferee.
296 3 W. PAGE, supra note 6, §§ 26.140-41, at 321-27; T. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at
798-99.
297 Even a pre-judgment writ of attachment obtained against the estate might offer
no protection to the heir's creditor: Under state law, the lien may terminate ifjudgment
is not obtained before the estate is closed. Kerson, supra note 273, at 26. Whether such
a writ would even be effective against the estate also depends upon state law, see supra
note 274.
298 T. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 692-705; see UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 3-803, 3-804,
3-806(b) & (c), 3-810(b)(2) (1982).
299 Of course, if the creditor of the heir is permitted to assert his claim in probate,
the heir should be made a party to the proceeding. See In re Harootenian's Estate, 38
Cal. 2d 242, 252, 238 P.2d 992, 998 (1951) (absence of heir as a party cited as a reason
to limit standing); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-806(b) (1982) (notice requirement for pro-
bate proceeding on allowance of claim against the estate). All of this analysis seems
equally pertinent to the question of creditor standing to challenge a disclaimer. The
issue arose in Stein v. Brown, 18 Ohio St. 3d 305, 308, 480 N.E.2d 1121, 1122-24
(1985), where the court granted standing to an unliquidated tort claimant to intervene
in the executor's action for a declaratory judgment to determine the effectiveness of the
debtor's disclaimer. The court cited to the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which
grants standing to non-judgment creditors. In Stein, the tort claimant had already com-
menced an action in tort in the common law court. Quaere whether the court would have
granted standing in probate absent a concurrent suit to establish the merits of the tort
claims. See supra note 292. Cf supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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ble to coordinate rules governing will contests with rules governing
disclaimers. Because the possibility of disclaimer follows a success-
ful will contest, the connection between the two is direct as well as
analogical. Yet courts have rarely appeared to recognize, let alone
show concern for, this fact.300 As with the problem of disclaimer,
courts are split on the question of standing to contest a will. In this
instance, however, the majority and minority rules are reversed:
Most states permit lien creditors to institute the contest.30 1 In Iowa,
for example, a creditor has standing to challenge a will disinheriting
his debtor, but the debtor (seemingly) remains free to disclaim his
inheritance once the contest succeeds.30 2 Vice versa in Pennsylvania,
a creditor may prevent his debtor from disclaiming, but if the debtor
has instead submitted a fraudulent will that accomplishes the same
purpose, his creditor lacks standing to do anything about it.303 Even
in states that both permit disclaimers and bar contests, the excep-
tion for collusion applies only to disclaimers; the grossest forms of
fraudulent probate would remain irremediable.30 4 Again, it would
appear, the spectre of categorization haunts this field.
V.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued for a dual response to the problem of
the insolvent heir. Given the inefficiency of reliance upon inheri-
tance, fraud theory dictates that voluntary creditors should have no
right to enjoin an insolvent disclaimer, absent prior representation
of ownership over the corpus of the bequest. Indeed, on the same
basis, the corpus could be made exempt from prior contract credi-
300 An exception is In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 813, 108 P.2d 401, 404 (1940)
(proscribing insolvent disclaimer in light of creditor's right of contest). Cf., In re Shep-
ard's Estate, 107 Pa. 323, 325, 32A. 1040, 1041 (1895) (erroneously equating contest
issue with creditor's powerlessness to enjoin acceptance of an inter vivos gift); Lockard
v. Stephenson, 120 Ala. 641, 645-46, 24 So. 996, 997 (1899) (same); In re Duffy's Estate,
228 Iowa 426, 434, 292 N.W. 165, 172 (1940) (distinguishing contest issue from gift
issue on the ground that lack of standing may thwart testamentary intent, discussed supra
text accompanying notes 280-82.).
301 See Note, The Right of a Creditor, supra note 273, at 315 n.50.
302 Duffy's Estate, 228 Iowa at 426, 292 N.W. at 165; In re Estate of Pearson, 319
N.W.2d 248, 249 (Iowa 1982) (dicta). This is all the more remarkable, given that Iowa
has produced several of the "leading cases" for the principle that creditors cannot pre-
vent an insolvent disclaimer. E.g., Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N.W. 20
(1920). Whether Schoonover would apply to an inheritance received as a result of a will
contest has not been addressed directly. See Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d at 813, 108 P.2d at
404.
303 Shepard's Estate, 170 Pa. St. at 323, 32 A. at 1040. For disclaimer cases in Penn-
sylvania, see supra note 44. The continued viability of these cases is unsettled. See supra
note 62.
304 See supra note 279. Whether the exception should apply in either situation de-
pends, however, on whether we give precedence to dominion theory or fraud theory.
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tors' claims, thereby permitting the debtor to accept his inheritance.
By contrast, involuntary creditors, having had no opportunity to
bargain with the debtor, should be permitted to veto the debtor's
disclaimer, both on grounds of morality and economic efficiency.
The same bifurcated analysis applies to the problem of a creditor's
power to mandate the exercise of a right of election and to contest a
will disinheriting his debtor.
The tension between this approach and dominion theory, which
requires that some uniform line of cleavage be drawn between
"owned" and "unowned" property, can only be resolved by aban-
doning dominion theory. Since dominion theory has no independ-
ent foundation in policy, 30 5 there is no reason to accord it
deference; mere aesthetic symmetry is no substitute for utility.
The more substantive tension between (involuntary) creditors'
rights of recovery and the autonomy of gratuitous transactors
should be resolved by affirming the testator's right expressly to dis-
inherit the debtor, but by rejecting attempts (either by rule of law or
construction) to implement his "probable" intent. The beneficiary,
in turn, should retain the right to reject inter vivos gifts against even
involuntary creditors' objections,30 6 but not to refuse inherited as-
sets. The invasion of the beneficiary's autonomy appears smaller in
the testamentary setting, where onerous moral responsibilities are
less likely to accompany acceptance.
Needless to say, none of these conclusions are inescapable.
Policy analysis inherently involves normative judgments, over which
reasonable minds may differ. The abandonment of moral analysis
of commercial credit,30 7 the subordination of the principle of testa-
mentary intent effectuation, 30 8 and the narrowing of the autonomy
of the beneficiary,30 9 are all open to debate. As always in the law,
the issues are tangled and the questions linger; for, to return to the
wisdom of Grant Gilmore, "[T]he path of the law leads not to the
revelation of truth but to the progressive discovery of infinite
complexity. "3 1 0
Still, we should not hesitate to undertake the search. One of
the troubling consequences of the proliferation of legal categories
has been their tendency to suppress inquiry, by fostering rigid and
formalistic modes of reasoning-a tendency that is all too apparent
305 See supra text accompanying text note 119.
306 Because creditors virtually never learn of inter vivos gift offers (which, unlike
probate proceedings, are not matters of public record), this would be the practical out-
come, even in the face of a legal rule to the contrary.
307 See supra text accompanying notes 121-25.
308 See supra text accompanying notes 211-36.
309 See supra text accompanying notes 187-2 10.
310 Gilmore, For Arthur Leff, 91 YALE LJ. 217, 218 (1981).
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in the case law of disclaimers and fraudulent conveyances. These
divers (and diverse) formalisms flourish in isolation, but when they
confront each other along categorical borders-such as the border
between gratuitous transfers law and debtor-creditor law-they cry
out for deeper analysis to bridge discontinuities. Prosser was
right:311 The no-law's land between categories provides fertile soil
for substantive analysis, because it is there that interconceptual ten-
sions lie embarrassingly exposed. Substantive analysis may have to
begin at the fringe before it can spread inward. But Prosser overes-
timated the power even of tension to stimulate judicial thought.
Formalism, alas, has powerful attractions: Judges are busy persons,
and a backward glance at precedent affords far more adjudicative
economy than does cogitation over policy.3 1 2 One of the lessons of
the insolvent heir is that, even at the border between contrary for-
malisms, judges may be tempted to finesse problems of reconcilia-
tion simply by insisting that the case falls into one formal category
or the other-a phenomenon that Justice Frankfurter noticed and
criticized in a related context as "the cross-sterilization of
disciplines." 31 3
Of course, the very fact that judges must choose between catego-
ries in borderline cases may lead them to make implicit policy judg-
ments-however carefully considered-that they would not
otherwise have made at all. In this regard, one cannot but feel am-
bivalent about a case like Scrivani,3 14 where the court invoked two
contradictory formalisms in the same opinion to distinguish the
rights of Medicaid creditors from the rest of the field. The holding
conformed with the bifurcated approach to disclaimers advocated
here, and it seems likely that the court's analytical contortions fol-
lowed from its underlying policy concerns. 31 5 But the court's com-
plaisant dependence on formalistic reasoning to dispose of those
concerns forestalled the development of a substantive theory of in-
solvent disclaimer that subsequent judges, faced with other sorts of
creditors' claims, could refer to and build upon. To this extent, the
opinion in Scrivani left much to be desired.
A second unfortunate consequence of categorization high-
311 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
312 Cf arguments associated with Critical Legal Studies that judges developed legal
formalism in order to camouflage the economic and political choices implicit within
common law rules. See, e.g., M. HoRwrrz, supra note 188, at 253-66. It seems to me that
pressure toward legal formalism can be explained easily enough without postulating
such dominative conspiracies.
313 Quoted in Spiegel, Peer Review, 27 THE Scx. 16, 19 (Sept.-Oct. 1987).
314 In re Scrivani, 116 Misc. 2d 204, 455 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup. Ct. 1982), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 77-87.
315 See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
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lighted by the insolvent heir is the tendency of independent catego-
ries to develop groundless inconsistencies. 31 6 To be sure, some
inconsistencies, such as the inconsistent treatment of autonomy
under inheritance law and fraudulent conveyance law, reflect con-
flicting policy objectives that fully justify the asymmetry and require
compromise only at points of intersection. But other "parallel" in-
consistencies, such as the disparate treatment of disclaimer, non-
election, and non-contest of a will, have no basis in policy. They are
the offspring of judges and legislators who wear blinders. Surely,
another lesson of the insolvent heir is that lawmakers toiling within
legal categories ought to peek over the barriers from time to time to
ensure that their efforts correspond with those conducted in other
segments of the legal landscape.
All of this is not to suggest that we should dismantle the barri-
ers that separate legal categories. 31 7 Much like the process of speci-
ation in biology, the process of categorization in law can generate
analytical (as opposed to adaptive) efficiencies whose benefits far
outweigh their costs.3 1 8 It is difficult to imagine a workable legal
system without them. But some sorts of barriers hurt more than
others. The early forms of action were painful precisely because
they were forms: arbitrary, inflexible rules and remedies that re-
quired literally centuries of imaginative advocacy to circumvent.3 19
We need not mourn their passing. Though the modern system of
common law categories that has risen to replace them has proven far
more plastic, it nonetheless continues to exhibit many of the draw-
backs of its predecessor-as the insolvent heir can amply testify.320
If only we could somehow render the modern ghosts of the forms of
action more truly ethereal, there would be little cause to fear them.
316 This phenomenon has been noticed before. See, e.g., Palmer, The Effect of Indefi-
niteness on the Validity of Trusts and Powers of Appointment, 10 UCLA L. REv. 241, 290-91
(1963).
317 Proposals to collapse certain related legal categories have been made on occa-
sion. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 89-90 (1974) (contract and tort).
318 For a related analysis of the costs and benefits of categorization, see Leff, Contract
as Thing, 19 AM. U.L. REV. 131, 131-37 (1970). For an early discussion, see Pound,
Classification of Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 933, esp. 944 (1924). For a study of the birth of a
legal category, see Alexander, The Transformation of Trusts as a Legal Category, 1800-1914, 5
L. & HIST. REV. 303 (1987). Cf Amadon, Specialization and Evolution, 77 AM. NATURALIST
133 (1943) (discussing the efficiency of specialization in nature); E. MAYR, EVOLUTION
AND THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 20-22 (1976) (same).
319 The story is brilliantly told in S. MILsoM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COM-
MON LAW (1969).
320 But cf ThesigerJ.: "Now I do not take the view that the ghosts of the old forms
of action always stand in one's path clanking their chains. I think that if one is not
unduly timorous one may find that they are waving one along the path ofjustice." Mc-
Alpine & Sons Ltd. v. Minimax Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 397, 422 (Q.B. 1970).
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